# GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS

## WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

## EDUCATIONAL

## APPLICATIONS.

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CONTENTS

# I.

## ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL GROUPS.

Any number of individuals who mutually influence one another through psychical interaction constitutes a social group. Our definition thus starts with a minimum of two individuals mentally related to each other, and is sufficiently wide to cover human aggregates of all forms and any magnitude, from a village community to a group of independent nations provided they enter into psychical relations with one another. For the formation of a social group in our sense of the words simultaneous physical presence is obviously not a necessary condition. Nor is any degree of formal organisation indispensable, although that is a characteristic feature of all higher groups. The same may be said of duration or permanence, since a social group may be as transitory as a chance-met crowd watching a street accident or as lasting as life-long partnership in marriage. What is vital to the creation and maintenance of a social group is some kind of psychical or mental interactivity, in virtue of which its individual component members come to possess certain common contents of consciousness either in the sphere of emotion or belief and opinion. But while all social aggregates form groups of one kind or another, it is evident that not all groups

can be called social. For example, the blind people of all countries as contrasted with normal-sighted men and women may be conveniently set apart in a special group by themselves with their characteristic physical and mental differences, but in so far as they are not in any way conscious of some common interest or purpose among themselves, the all-important test of psychical interaction does not apply in their case. Again, all students of Confucianism would naturally fall into a group by themselves. But in so far as they work independently of one another without being aware of their common quest or of the several problems that each has proposed for his own solution, they do not form a social group. While every social group, irrespective of its size or duration ,is more or less conscious of its own corporate existence especially when contrasted with other groups of a similar type, it is only the more permanent and highly organised groups that can properly be said to possess a group consciousness of its own. A chance meeting between two individuals on the ~~steet~~ street may constitute a social group while they discuss matters of mutual interest or deliberate upon the means of achieving some common purpose. But the social bond that unites such persons is very frequently of an ephemeral character, and moreover not sustained by conscious and definite organisation.Above all, it would not be possible to

detect such special mental characteristics as may be directly attributed to active participation in the life of some larger group. Let us next consider a city crowd that has gathered to watch an outbreak of fire. For some brief moments its common interest is aroused and maintained by the conflagration, but as soon as it is over each individual member of the crowd goes his own way and pursues his own business. Such a crowd disperses never to meet again in its entirety, even though a similar ~~exciting cause~~ opportunity should again pre-sent itself. In addition to its extremely transiant character, such a crowd is not held together by any form of organisation. Even if we suppose that, when actuated by a common desire to save the burning property, all the members of the crowd through the contagion of imitation and suggestion rush forward with enthusiasm to volunteer their services, their haphazard efforts will be subject to much confusion and disorder for want of conscious co-ordination under the direction of a recognised leader.

For these reasons the social groups that come within the scope of this essay would be more or less restricted to those groups exhibiting at least two important characteristics in common, in whatever other respects they may differ, namely, some degree of permanence combined with some form of conscious organnisation. No group spirit, properly speaking, can develop

unless these two essential conditions are fulfilled. An army is a highly organised group; it is vividly conscious of its corporate existence, especially when facing the foe. Similarly, a church or a trade union or a school has a characteristic group spirit of its own.

Before we proceed to consider these highly organised groups, however, it will be profitable to trace as far back as we can the evolutionary history of man in its social aspects. Biology has strikingly shown that all living organisms together with many extinct species represent one continuous and unbroken series in the course of evolution, and that consequently many of the deepest instincts and impulses of human nature as we find it to-day cannot be intelligently understood without some reference to the prehuman and prehistoric stages of development. Throughout our present enquiry this point of view will be kept before us, and it is this viewpoint that now demands us to make a preliminary survey of animal societies as well as primitive human groups. In thus reconstructing our evolu - tionary past, at best we can only seek to discover some of its most important landmarks while many gaps are still awaiting to be filled. Unaided by authentic records, we have to fall back upon two main sources of information , namely , anthropology , and the

study of animal societies. As the knowledge derived from these sources will be mainly of an inferential character what we may reasonably put forward is therefore nothing more than a set of working hypotheses that appear to give the most satisfactory explanation of, and to be in harmony with, the salient features of man's social nature as we find it to-day.

Biologically, animal gregariousness seems to have been everywhere preceded by a solitary stage. We may suppose that when the unicellular organism develops into a multicellular organism, the individual cells, while losing their elasticity and independence through undergoing such specialisation of function as is necessary for their co-ordination within a single system, gain the signal advantage of being shielded from the direct operation of natural selection. Henceforth, survival in the struggle for existence depends on the fitness of the mutlticellular organism as a whole, and up to a certain point the unfitness of individual component cells will entail no fatal consequences. But multicellularity can only be regarded as a favourable variation, and like all variations, sooner or later it reaches a stage where further expansion would cease to be advantageous. It is precisely at that stage, one may suppose, that gregariousness first emerges as a further variation. The advantages of gregariousness are obvious. The ~~hard~~ herd or pack as a whole now becomes the unit on which natural selection directly op-

operates. To its individual members, it stands much in the same relation as a multicellular organism to its individual component cells.

Gregariousness, however, must not be regarded as a universal character in the evolution of every species. For it is conditioned by two main factors: Firstly, food is the most pressing need of all creatures, and, where it is scarce, gregariousness will be a serious hindrance in the struggle for existence. In regions where food is abundant and therefore easily obtained, there can be no necessity for a gregarious life save in the matter of mutual defence against common enemies. This point introduces us to the second factor, namely, the strength and agility of the individual members of a species as compared with the strength of their possible enemies. A large animal strong enough to defend itself unaided against all possible rivals will naturally lead a solitary life or at most live in an isolated family group, e.g. the gorilla. The condition of food-supply taken in conjunction with the means of defence against attacks, would apparently determine whether a species should be gregarious or solitary, and if gregarious, to what extent.

Of animal societies, we may distinguish three different types. (1) The polymorphic type. It is best represented by ants and bees which live in large communities maintained by co-orperation among structurally

different classes of individuals. Here gregariousness has been developed to such an extent that no individual insect can survive prolonged separation from its nest or hive. An ant colony, as is well-known, consists of workers and/or wingless neuters, and winged males and females for propagation of the species. With many species of ants, especially those belonging to the genera Eciton, Colobopsis, Pheidologeton, and Pheidole, the wingless neuters are further divided into workers proper and soldiers, their differences being recognisable by the stronger jaws and more powerful build of the latter. Similarly, the hive with its queen and worker-bees and drones exhibit a high degree of specialisation in bodily structure that marks off different classes within the community. With the bees as with the ants, the individual is completely absorbed into the community, lives and labours for it, and is quite unable to drag out a separate existence from the larger whole of which it forms part. Taking the honey-bees for illustration, Mr Trotter writes, "The hive may, in fact, without any very undue stretch of fantasy be described as an animal of which all the individual cells have retained the power of locomotion".[1]

(2) The herd type, as is to be seen in a flock of sheep. It exists for mutual protection against common

1. Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, 1920 p. 106

enemies. The individual animal reacts with special vigour and promptitude to stimuli coming from the herd. Hence the whole herd may be seized with sudden panics through the sympathetic spread of the emotion of fear. Leaders are recognised by all herds that migrate from place to place, and their position is, as is usually the case with cattle, determined by combat.

(3) The hunting pack type, as represented by the wolves. These carnivores hunt in large groups, which are, unlike the herd, aggressive; and in their case gregariousness gives the individuals enhanced power for attack.

To both the herd and the pack we have to return later. At this stage we need only point out that, as types of animal gregariousness, they are to be distinguished from the bee or ant community in two important respects. First, the individual members of the herd or pack undergo no such structural specialisation as is characteristic of both ants and bees. Apart from differences of sex, any sheep or wolf plays its part in common defence or attack. Secondly, it follows that the dependence of the individual upon the community is less absolute than the polymorphic insects. If for example, a small number of wolves become accidentally detached from the main pack it is not improbable that they will still be able to fend for themselves and may even form the neucleus of a new colony. On the other hand, the worker ants and their winged companions are so utterly dependent upon one another that separation between the two classes would mean

extinction for both, the one for want of reproductive power, the other for lack of food and ~~the~~ means of defence.

Now, which of these types does primitive human gregariousness most resemble? Obviously at no time has it led to differentiation in bodily structure as in the case of bees and ants. The caste system that has prevailed in certain societies must be regarded as a considerably later development; and moreover, however rigidly it may have been enforced, it has nowhere succeeded in reducing potentially free and independent individuals to the position of constituent cells in an animal organism, to which, as we have seen, the polymorphic insects may be likened. We are accordingly left with no alternative but to choose between the herd and the pack. After carefully enquiring into the subject, we are driven to the conclusion that the hunting pack, rather than the herd, must have been the earliest form of human gregariousness.

The origin of human society will probably always remain an unsettled question. Different writers have advanced various theories to account for it. For example, Sir Henry Maine claimed to have derived from his study of comparative jurisprudance sufficient evidence in favour of some form of the Roman patriachal organisation. On the other hand, Bachofen, McLennan, and Sir John Lubbock after independent enquiry all came to the opposite conclusion that the origin of society must have been matriarchal, and accordingly kinship was first reckoned only

through the mother.Without staying to consider any of these rival theories,it suffices to point out that none of these writers really traced human society to its very source and origin.For it is obvious that prior to the patriarchal or matriarchal organisation of human society there must have been a stage where the human species itself was only being slowly evolved from its non-human progenitors.

Human gregariousness certainly appears to have been as primitive a character as the first emergence of humanity itself.This fact, of course, does not affect the validity of our previous statement that, in the evolutionary history, gregariousness must have been preceded by a solitary stage of development.As far as the lower organisms are concerned,gregariousness can only be regarded as of later origin than the more primordial instincts of nutrition,sex,and self-preservation,while on the other hand in dealing with man as already evolved from the anthropoid stock,we are bound to admit the equal primacy of the gregarious instinct with those commonly recognised.

Let us note in passing,however,that Westermarck holds a different view from the one here expounded. Arguing from the solitary habits of the anthropoid apes together with primitive man's difficulties of obtaining a sufficient food-supply,he attempts to show that

Human Marriage,1891,p.49

gregariousness could have only emerged at a later stage when the shortage was overcome by the invention and use of weapons."The kind of food he(primitive man) subsisted upon,together with the large quantities of it that he wanted,probably formed a hindrance to a true gregarious manner of living except perhaps in some unusually rich places".But,Westermarck continues,with the invention of weapons,tools,and traps,man gradually found out new ways of eking out his means of sunsistence.In this way the chief obstacle to gregariousness was in part surmounted and the advantages of such a life induced families and small gangs to live together in large bodies."Such a theory may contain some element of truth in certain cases,but it utterly fails to explain exactly how man became differentiated from the anthropoid stock.Moreover, the formation of the hunting pack,as we shall see presently,is itself the only conceivable means of meeting the difficulties of food-supply during the period of natural subsistence of man,to which Westermarck appears to have attached so much significance.

The arguments in favour of the hunting pack as the earliest form of human gregariousness have been most convincingly put forward by Carveth Read.Our anthropoid ancesters,according to this writer,appear to have, in the Miocene if not earlier,adopted a flesh diet

either as a spontaneous variation which had proved

cf.The Origin of Man and of his Superstitions, 1920,Chap. I.and II.

favourable to the species,or as the result of an accidental shortage of fruit and vegetables on which they had hitherto subsisted.The adoption of a flesh diet made it necessary or advantageous for the man-apes to resort to co-operative hunting ,as it seems probable that from the outset they may have attacked Ungulates and other big game.Physically,the hunting life has led, among other things, to the erect attitude of man that facilitates quick running in pursuing his game prior to the invention of weapons.The mental differentiation as a result of co-operative hunting is even more striking.Apart from those characteristics which the hunting pack shares in common with the herd,the former is marked by an aggressive disposition to all animals outside the pack either as prey or competitors for prey.The members of the pack must resort to strategy,persevere in attack,and develop a strong feeling of emulation,so that if it loses its leader,others will be ready to his place.Human intellect may be said to have first developed under these conditions.

The anthroipoid apes have as yet hardly advanced beyond isolated family groups.Although it is said that gorillas and chimpanzees have been seen in large parties,they are usually found in small family groups or at most several families banded together.The orang-outang is usually seen alone with its mate and young ones. On the other hand,man is everywhere gregarious,at the

very least we find a number of families grouped together in the same hamlet or locality. There seems hardly any doubt that human gregariousness is derived from the hunting life adopted by his pre-human ancestors, or probably we may say with more accuracy that it is a reversion to the habits of his more remote progenitors, the smaller anthropoids like the baboon and the gibbon, which are always found in large troops. In either case the formation of the hunting pack is the only hypothesis that best fits in with the facts so far available.

Carveth Read's hypothesis will carry even greater conviction when we come to consider the inadequacy of regarding the herd as the most primitive form of human gregariousness. In the first place, such a theory fails to explain the obviously imperfect socialisation of man. Under the necessity of mutual defence for which the herd is formed and maintained, there would have to be continuous presence in the herd and never at any time outside of it. On the other hand, the hunting pack demands, in the nature of the case, nothing more than intermittent gregariousness, relieved by periods of solitude. For while the pack is of supreme advantage in co-operative hunting, it is useless in other social relations. From the fact that man's original nature was moulded by the requirements of a hunting life, it is easy to understand how it still reasserts itself in our alternate desires now for society, now for

solitude. In the second place, membership in the herd cannot explain the undoubtedly aggressive nature of man. True, the herd may and does act in united defence, but psychologically at any rate that is totally different from organised pugnacity with the interest of the whole pack in the chase. The original nature of man, in the absence of moral and legal restraints, shows that with him the pugnacious instinct is unusually strong, probably stronger than any carnivore to be found to-day. No carnivore would attack and kill its prey for no other purpose than the satisfaction of the love of killing as human beings undoubtedly do sometimes. Moreover, the whole psychology of conation in man would appear to be unintelligible unless we take into account his instinct of pugnacity. With all normal men, the volitional life is dominated by ever-new desires which in the nature of things can never be completely satisfied. These ever-new and unending desires seem to correspond to the pursuit of fresh game with every expedition of the hunting pack.

Having traced the origin of human gregariousness, let us follow its progress some little distance. First of all, the hunting life, we may suppose, leads

For illustration, it will be only necessary to mention the extermination of the Newfoundland aborigines between 1730 and 1830; the Russian massacre of defenceless Chinese at Blagovetchensk on the Amur during the Boxer Rising of 1900; the Japanese atrocities in Korea and in formosa since the annexation of the former in 1905 and of the latter in 1894.

in the course of time to the distinct demarcation of a hunting range, within which the pack may freely pursue its game, and into which rival packs may not intrude. Among the Australian aborigines[1] it is said that " there are local groups, each having exclusive rights over a well-defined hunting ground".[2] Within this delimited area, each pack would move and live in the form of an undifferentiated horde comprising a number of individuals, who were not by any means bound to each other by family ties. "We have thus to begin", says Spencer,[1] "with a state in which the family as we understand it does not exist. In the loose groups of men first formed, there is no established order of any kind: everything indefinite, unsettled. As the relations of men to one another are undetermined, so are the relations of men to women". But though the primitive horde is undifferentiated, the way is already paved to the rise of the family or what amounts to family relations. Under these conditions of life, the more obvious connection of the human infant with its mother, its long youth and consequent dependence upon her care and ministrations naturally point to the beginnings of some form of maternal organisation in which the father plays a less significant rôle. Probably ~~at the same time~~ just as the males of gregarious animals that usually fight for the possession

1. Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, Chap. III, p. 601.
2. Quoted by Sollas, Ancient Hunters, p. 193

of females, primitive men also fight for the possession of women. This view is supported by Darwin, though it is necessary to point out that what he regards as aboriginal is in our interpretation a secondary stage of development. Darwin[1] regards as "the most probable view" that man "aboriginally lived in small communities, each with a single wife, or if powerful, with several, whom he jealously guarded against all other men". Sir John Lubbock has also compared primitive men to stags in the way they fight for the possession of a mate. This exclusive possession of women held by force cannot but lead to some kind of family life, whether monogamous or polygamous, at any rate as long as the man is strong enough to maintain his position. In some such manner we may suppose that the primitive horde comes to be differentiated into a number of separate families welded together by their common possession of the same hunting-ground.

Natural selection will favour those societies in which a more vigorous stock is produced as a result of more stable unions and consequently better-reared offspring. This practically means that, in the course of social development, relations between men and women tend to acquire greater and greater permanence until the institution of marriage comes to be established.

Through inter-marriage, the separate family groups unite to form a clan, whose members are welded together by a belief in their common descent from the same ancestral stock, and by their common allegience to the

1. The Descent of Man

same patriarch or chieftain. A time comes, however, when the clan inevitably splits itself into smaller groups either through the stern necessity of finding fresh sources of food-supply for an increased population or merely through some fundamental disagreement that may arise between certain families within the clan. In either case this may result in an extension of the old boundaries of its hunting range at the expense of some neighbouring clan or clans, or in founding new colonies over widely scattered areas at some distance from the old parent stock. We may suppose that as the larger and more united groups enjoy an indisputable advantage in the struggle of societies rendered inevitable by natural growth and other causes, and that the clan which succeeds in welding together under one chieftain all its different branches scattered over a wide area, tends to survive its weaker and less united rivals. Such a clan which in reality embraces a number of smaller units marks the beginning of the tribe. "A tribe is", according to Professor Baldwin Spencer,[1] "a group of individuals speaking a common dialect.....and regarded as owning a definite tract of country, the boundaries of which are known to them and recognised by the members of other tribes,...the real test of whether a native is or is not a member of any particular tribe is whether, under normal conditions, he may wander freely over the country owned by that tribe."

The further development of society is marked by the emergence of a new stage. Hunting has by now become more and more precarious as a means of subsistence,

1. Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia, 1914, p. 34

since the population tends to grow while big game tends to become scarce. The first great advance in the history of civilisation is made when tribes of hunters and warriors become tribes of "settled herdsmen"[1] who domesticate sheep and cattle and live in fixed abodes. The earliest society in Europe, according to Schrader, takes the form of pastoral communities. By that he probably means that when these primitive races extended their inhabited area from the tropical and sub-tropical regions to the European continent, they had already reached the tribal stage of development. At all events, with the "settled herdsmen" who live in communities, the rudiments of a civic society may be said to have begun.

An even more epoch-making advance is made, however, with the discovery of agriculture in the beginning of the Neolithic period which Sir Arthur Keith[2] puts at circa 6,000 or 7000 years before Christ. Before the agricultural stage, according to the same writer, the present area of the Thames Valley could have hardly supported twenty wandering families in Neolithic times by its natural products of plant, game, and fish; and yet to-day it maintains over seven millions of Londoners. While it may be pointed out that the enormous population of London is maintained by modern industrialism rather than agriculture, it is nevertheless true that, before the rise of modern industry, agriculture was, directly or indirectly, the most important factor in rendering human gregariousness on a large scale possible. With the growth of agricultural

1. Schrader, Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte.
2. Art. on 'The Dawn of National Life' in Peoples of All Nations, Part I, 1922

communities, organised and stable societies embodying the idea of a res publica may by said to have sprung into existence.

Modern industrialism as we see it to-day is only about a century old, and it is therefore still in its youth as compared with the immense age of man's agricultural development. But it is significant that modern industry has, even if we attribute the rise of large towns in the first instance to the operation of the gregarious instinct, been the material foundation of the vast human aggregates of the twentieth century. Without it, no large towns like London or Shanghai can remain in a prosperous condition.

One important conclusion we may draw from this brief survey of a vast subject is that gregariousness was, as we have seen, an indispensable condition in the evolution of our species from the anthropoid stock, and that man's social development has throughout been characterised by his rendering that primitive gregariousness of the hunting pack more stable, more orderly, and above all, by his increasing its scope and variety. Accepting Carveth Read's hypothesis as we do, it may be also observed that man's social progress has been marked by the gradual displacement of the hunting pack by the peaceful herd. While this seems to fit in with the facts, however, the hunting pack type of group consciousness is, as we hope to show later, far superior to the herd type, and for this reason it ought to be encouraged in education.

## II.

## CLASSIFICATION OF GROUPS.

Among primitive peoples social groups of various types may be readily distinguished. Besides the family and the clan based on different degrees of kinship, and the tribe comprising a number of local groups placed on a strictly territorial basis, there are numerous other groups whose organisation is regulated by strict and unquestioning obedience to custom, traditional rules and superstitious beliefs. For example, totemic groups comprising in each case a body of men and women who regard themselves as of one blood through descent from a common ancestor and as all bearing some mystic affinity to a common totem which may be some animal or plant or insect, are widely distributed throughout Australia, Africa, and America, though by no means universal. Professor Baldwin Spencer[1] points out that in Northern Australia every individual is associated with a totemic group, and that as far as the social aspects of totemism are concerned, such groups fall into two divisions: (1) Exogamic groups, which may be subdivided into (a) those which are matrilineal and (b) those which are patrilineal. (2) Non-exogamic groups which are subdivided into (a) where the tribe is divided into two moities which are again subdivided into classes and sub-classes, throughout which the totemic groups are distributed in such a way as to ensure the presence of the same group in both

1-Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia, p. 14.

moities.(b)where the tribe is divided neither into moieties nor into classes and sub-classes,but into a number of local inter-marrying groups not in any way depending on totemic distinctions.Despite local differences all the tribes of Northern Australia have clearly established a totemic system which may or may not be exogamous. Sir J.G.Frazer[1] has reported that"the totem bond is stronger than the bond of blood or family in the modern sense", and thus it may happen that a local group may be dissolved by blood feuds between its members belonging to different totems.

"Secret societies"[2] whose real aims and organisation are not known to outsiders,are said to exist among the Melanesians, and certain Australian tribes.Membership of one or more of these organisations ,which involves elaborate initiation ceremonies,appears to be eagerly sought by all youths as an unmistakable sign of having attained manhood.These "secret societies" belong to various types,though an air of mystery hangs over them all. For instance,one society known as Dukduk apparently has as its chief object the extortion of shell-money by organised force from all outsiders,usually women and children,on almost any pretext whatsoever.Thus once a lad was fined "three fathoms of shell-money for breaking a member's pipe which can be bought for a finger's length".Another secret organisation called the Iniat[3]

1.Totemism,1887,p.57
2.Geo.Brown,Melanesians and Polynesians,p.59 seq.
3. op.cit.p.72

appears to have no other object than collective revenge for any injury sustained by any individual member or members.

In addition to those already mentioned, there are numerous others of a more transitory character. For example all primitive peoples engage in co-operative hunting or fishing. Among the Melanesians[1] it is said that "large hunting parties were often formed to hunt cassaworries, wallabies, and wild pigs" and "the spoils were generally divided amongst all those who had taken part in the hunt and their families". The Eastern Mongols of the Buryat clan are well-known for "their institution of a co-operative hunt in which all the members of the clan or of several allied clans take part". "The hunt may last for several months ...."[2].

With the advance of civilisation, there has been an ever-increasing tendency to multiply the variety and to extend the scope, of social organisations. The succesive discoveries and inventions of science, the progressive refinement of literary and aesthetic tastes, and the ennobling of the human spirit in its higher spheres have combined to create new wants, new desires, new ideals, which can be more effectively realised by group, rather than individual, action. With the advent of democracy first confined to political organisations and now

1. op. cit. p. 321.
2. Miss Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia, p. 65

gradually extended to the sphere of industry, the extension of popular control has more than ever emphasised the need for collective deliberation and decision on all questions, great and small. To the various political parties and their election campaigns alone may be attributed a vast number of social groups unknown in the days of absolute monarchy. A marked feature of international relations at the present day is the numerous international groups formed for the achieving of some purpose or object shared by a group of nations and consequently transcending the boundaries of individual States. Whether organised by independent governments such as the League of Nations, Allied Commisions in Germany, the Washington Conference, or formed by private individuals in various countries such as the international labour movement, the Boy Scouts, the Salvation Army, on every side one is caught in the full tide of co-operation on a larger and larger scale. All this increasing complexity and varied character of the social groups of to-day have rendered it extremely difficult to offer a satisfactory scheme of classification. The task is complicated by the fact that social groups present numerous aspects or points of view, from any one of which one may proceed to classify them.

To illustrate the above statement, we need only mention some of the attempts already made in this direction by sociologists, social philosophers, and crowd-psychologists. Professor Cooley[1] appears to have made a

1. Social Organisation, Chap. III.

classification based on the sole factor of physical presence. Thus he divides social groups into (1) primary and (2) secondary, forms. The former is characterised by "face to face co-operation", while the latter involves co-operation without "face to face association". Ellwood[1] suggests a classification into "natural genetic groups", which are fundamental, and "artificial, functional forms of association", which are "the distinguishing marks of human society". The extent to which the latter modify the former serves as a basis of classification. Professor Ross[2] based his classfication on the degree of control or organisation. From this point of view, he pronounces the mob or excited crowd to be the lowest and the mass meeting under the control of a chairman slightly higher. The highest groups he finds to be the "corporations" such as the church, and the trade union. Giddings[3] has proposed a more psychological classification. Social groups are either (1) "instinctive" or (2) "rational". The "instinctive" groups are more confined to herds, swarms and flocks of animals, while the "rational" groups are restricted to human society. Of the latter he distinguishes eight types: (1) The "sympathetic" type e.g. a community of near blood relatives whose chief bond is sympathy. (2) The "congenial" type, such as when men group

1. Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, p. 349
2. Foundations of Sociology, Chap. VI.
3. Historical and Descriptive Sociology, Chap III quoted by Ellwood.

themselves together by having certain ideas and tastes in common.(3)The "approbational" type,in which the bond is "a general approbation of qualities and conduct",e.g a frontier settlement.(4)The"despotic" type in which the bond is common submission to some despot.(5) The "authoritative" type,based on reverence of authority. (6).The "conspirital"type,as represented by gangs of assassins.(7)The "contractual"type,based on a covenant or contract.(8)The "idealistic" type,in which an altruistic spirit serves as the social bond.

While not without merit,these various schemes of classification are in one way or another unsatisfactory.They all lack in comprehensiveness,which it is in the nature of the case difficult to achieve.More suggestive from our point of view is undoubtedly the method of classification devised by McDougall.[1] According to him,all groups ,with the exception of the simple crowd and other such ephemeral and fortuitous assemblage,may be divided into (1)"Natural" ,and(2)"Artificial". The former is subdivided into (a)"those rooted in kinship"and (b)"those determined by geographical conditions" The "artificial"groups fall into three main classes, namely : "the purposive","the customary or traditional", and "the mixed".However useful it may be in other connections,McDougall's classification does not appear to be adapted for the study of group life in the world of to-day.The two types of the "natural"groups which he illustrates by the family and the population of a small

1.The Group Mind,p.89 et seq.

island respectively are no doubt easily distinguishable from each other in spite of the fact that to a certain extent they cannot avoid overlapping.But it seems far otherwise with his subdivisions of the "artificial" groups.To begin with,it seems impossible to find the purely traditional type anywhere.McDougall points to the Hindu castes as the nearest approach to it.But surely no social group can be at once "artificial" and yet without some purpose which serves as the raison d'être of its coming into being.The purpose for which such a group comes to be formed and maintained may not assume the same form in the minds of all its members,or it may be even externally imposed upon them without their own voluntary consent,but as McDougall himself admits,a purpose there must have been at the beginning.McDougall[1] mentions the fact that the original purpose may become obscured with mere lapse of time ,and that if the group continues to exist,"myths and legends have grown up to explain the origin of,and give a fictitious purpose or raison d'être to,the group." But once the original purpose is lost sight of,the group as originally formed naturally dies with it,and if it apparently continues to exist under the old name,it may be said to have transformed itself into a new group in order to achieve some new purpose quite distinct from the old.Here the historical continuity is apparent,not real.We are therefore driven to the conclusion that no traditional group as a group may be said to have existed in reality.Furthermore,given sufficient permanence,every organised "pur-

1-op.cit.,p.92.

"purposive"group inevitably tends to acquire or to build up a body of traditions based on its own collective experience and reinterpreted by different generations of members.Not only that.A new organisation may and does often take over from similar but older organisations certain traditional rules of action and modes of procedure. Bearing these considerations in mind,one fails to see how "traditional"and "purposive" types could be so easily distinguishable from one another as to be of much real help to the student of group life.

It is hardly possible to deny that we have virtually reduced McDougall's three types of "artificial" groups to one,namely,the "mixed"or "partly traditional and partly purposive".All that McDougall has succeeded in doing is to indicate certain features common to all groups without really classifying them into any distinct types.

For a more psychological classification we have to turn to Dr Drever.[1] In his view social groups may be classified according to the three levels of mental process.Thus taking illustrative types,he places the 'crowd' type on the perceptual level,the 'club' type on the ideational level,and the 'community'type on the conceptual level.Dr Drever's classification presents several features worthy of note.It combines simplicity with comprehensiveness,inasmuch as the unorganised groups are not left out.In directing attention to the mental characteristics displayed by different types of social groups, it gives us a clue to to the discovery of psychological

1.Art.in Concordia,May,1921,(originally given as a lecture on 'The Mind of a Nation'before The Edinburgh International Club,May,13,1921.)

types. It has the additional merit of not arbitrarily confining any given group to a rigidly fixed type, as it really offers a scale of measurement adjustable to the changing character of the same group under different circumstances. For example, a highly organised modern nation which in Dr Drever's view normally belongs to the 'community' type may descend to the 'crowd' type and find its level there when popular feelings become agitated by some national danger or disaster.

We propose to adopt in the main Drever's classification as a working plan for producing a somewhat more detailed scheme of arrangement, taking as our guiding principle the degree of intelligence and reasoning power displayed by a social group as a group. One important addition, however, it has been found necessary to introduce:- to place the nation in a distinct category by itself instead of regarding it as a group of the community type. Our reasons for making this addition are: (1) A community is by no means synonymous with a nation, especially if by it we mean a modern nation-state. The one is a relative term, the other absolute. The population of a village is a community, but so is that of a town, and that of the whole of Western Europe as contrasted with the Orient. On the other hand, a nation or nation-state is at any given time a fixed social aggregate occupying a definite geographical area whose boundaries are rigidly fixed by treaty or natural barriers. True, immigrations and boundary revisions do take place from time to time in the case of certain states, but that does not alter the fact that while no one can claim more than one nationality at one and the same time, every one may and does belong

to several communities simultaneously. The mental differences between the two cases—between the narrowing consciousness of the membership of a self-contained nation, and the ever-widening consciousness of the membership of a community which is, with the exception of humanity as a whole, always part of some larger community —are sufficiently great to justify their separate recognition as distinct types.(2) A community is a community because its members lead a common life of some kind, which in itself is not necessarily organised in any comprehensive manner. On the other hand, a nation is never such a loose aggregate as a community so understood. It is more than a community in the sense that all the members of the same nationality not only lead a common life in virtue of their common tradition, sentiments, and ideals, but they are welded together and, as it were, 'kept in shape' by a complex system of social and political organisations operating within a definite area. Hence the characteristic feature of national consciousness, especially with highly developed nations, is its concreteness, vividness, and definiteness arising out of the fact that a nation is at any time rigidly marked off from all other nations by its sharp territorial limits, but also by ~~the~~ its particular type of political organisation. Every nation lays emphatic claim to its members, especially in time of war; and at best it is a complicated process to change one's nationality, and even when a person apparently succeeds in getting naturalised as the subeject of another nation, his old nationality still clings to him in most, if not all, of his social relations. A community certainly exhibits a group spirit of its

own, but in comparison with that of a nation it is somehow vague and indefinite. (3) Not every nation is a community even regarded from the point of view of its common life. A good illustration of this fact is the Austria of 1914 with its heterogeneous racial composition artificially held together under a monarchy that called forth no common sentiment of loyalty or devotion. Beneath the external show of national unity the Magyars, Bohemians, German Austrians, Czechs and other races represented distinctly different communities, each with its own traditions and ideals not only imcompatible with, but actually hostile to, those of the others.

To proceed with our classification, we propose four main divisions of social groups, as illustrated by 1. the crowd, 2. the club or association, 3. the community, and 4. the nation.

Social groups of the crowd type may be subdivided into (a) those dependent on physical presence, and (b) those independent of physical presence. Within the first order may be classed groups of three distinct levels as represented by (1) the mob, (2) the street accident spectators, (3) the theatre audience. Those groups independent of physical presence are the different publics created by the different newspapers. According to Dr Drever, the consciousness of the crowd is "a here-and-now consciousness." The mental life of all those groups depending primarily on physical presence comes well within this definition and can be recognised as clearly belonging to the crowd type. The mob is the lowest type because it is unorganised and fortuitously gathered, swayed by the coarser emotions, besides being extremely unstable and fickle, and ever tending to be more or less disorderly.

The spectators of a street accident are also fortuitously gathered, quite unorganised, and may under certain circumstances rapidly degenerate into a mob. But as long as they remain passive spectators with a certain degree of mental homogeneity maintained by a common centre of interest, they are usually orderly and well-behaved. The theatre audience is distinctly on a higher level than those already mentioned. As compared with the spectators of a street mishap, it is, at least as far as its individual members are concerned, not entirely fortuitous for the simple reason that it is in almost every case clearly anticipated, sometimes days and weeks in advance of the actual performance. Further, a theatre audience pre-supposes a certain degree of organisation, such as the issue of tickets, the numbering of seats etc., and its collective emotions and ideas are regulated in an orderly fashion by what is presented on the stage in accordance with some pre-arranged plan or programme. To this type ~~can~~ also belongs the mass meeting which is likewise to a small extent organised, under a chairman usually. The common characteristic of all groups of the crowd type is that they lack permanence. Once dispersed, their individual members never meet again in their entirety.

The public is treated as a crowd without physical presence because of the fact that the consciousness of the public as an unorganised and loose aggregate is equally a "here-and-now consciousness", as may be seen in the rapid alternation of popular feelings of fear, anger, and hope more or less shared by the readers of the same newspaper. Under certain circumstances, e.g. in time of war, even collective hallucinations may be created

without the least foundation, and such phenomena may be attributed to the press more than any other agency. The superiority of the public over those crowds constituted by bodily presence lies, however, in the fact that, being dispersed, its members enjoy better opportunities of calm reflection and therefore less subject to irrational unanimity of feelings and beliefs.

Groups of the club or association type are distinguishable from those of the crowd type in three important respects : (1) They are definitely organised, exhibiting orderly behavior at all times, and observing recognised rules of common action. (2) They are conscious of a common purpose or object which can be better realised by collective, rather than individual, action. (3) They alike enjoy a certain degree of permanence; in some cases, they may be regarded as everlasting.

It is customary to classify associations into religious, political, etc.; but, however serviceable such a classification may be to the social philosopher, it is of no value from the standpoint of group consciousness. For our purpose it will be best to sub-divide associations into two main types according to the way in which the fruits of their collective activities may be enjoyed; (1) 'several', and (2) 'associative'. To these terms is attached the same meaning as Mr Cole[1] proposes. He points out that all associations are based on "the consciousness of a want requiring co-operative action for its satisfaction". The severalty of clubs or associations consists in the fact that "each individual can enjoy the satisfaction of the want by himself", e.g. The Railway Season-ticket-holders' Association; and the numerous commercial

1. Social Theory, p. 34 et seq.

companies. The club only becomes associative when the satisfaction of the want can be enjoyed by the co-operating group as a whole. There is of course no hard and fast line between the two classes, and one may pass into the other. For instance, a number of miners may organise themselves into a union, because each desires individual advantages for himself, which can be best secured by co-operation. But, having so co-operated, they may become imbued with the associative spirit, and look beyond their own individual gains and losses to the welfare of the group as a whole. The group consciousness manifested in the two cases differs greatly. In a group of the 'several' type, it remains at a low level, as each member aims primarily at his personal benifit to be accrued from co-operation. It is in the 'associative' groups only that the group spirit is manifest. Each member is vividly conscious of some larger interests than those of his private life, and a group-sentiment is accordingly developed.

Of social groups of the community type three classes may be distinguished :(1) those derived from kinship, which may be either immediate, e.g. the family, or remote, e.g. the race. (2) those derived from a common physical environment, which may be either isolated, e.g., an Alpine village, or populous, e.g., a sea-port town. (3) those derived from a common civilisation, e.g., Western civilisation, or the Christian community in a Mohammedan country. In so far as a nation coincides with a community, it is here treated as a cultural unit undoubtedly of the community type; but as a nation-state, it represents a distinct type of its own.

The group spirit of a nation finds its highest expression in patriotism which is usually accompanied by a strong affect. Patriotism is commonly understood to mean the love of country. Without staying to consider

the ethical bearing of the question, patriotism in modern practice demands, as far as possible, the identification of the individual with the community. Thus on the one hand, it cannot tolerate the independent group spirit of the various communities contained within the national borders, such as the development of incompatible sentiments and ideals between the inhabitants of the north and those of the south. In time of war the persistent appeal to every individual throughout a country is for national unity, and obviously no national unity can be achieved until all ideas of local differences become displaced by a consciousness of national identity. At the same time, patriotism, especially of the imperialist type, is supposed to be weakened or undermined by the consciousness of some larger community beyond the nation. True, a group of nations at war with some common enemy may well regard each other as of one community, since solidarity among allies is a very important condition of victory. But we must never lose sight of the fact that in such a case each participant nation is usually, if not always, actuated by its private motives of national gain or glory, and with notable exceptions ~~the~~ the community of interest among allied nations is often more superficial than real. It is significant that in almost all countries the consciousness of the existence of larger communities beyond the nation is certainly not encouraged by education.

Nations fall into two main classes: (1) the aggressive, and (2) the pacific. The aggressive type is well illustrated by Japan since the close of the last century, or by Prussia before the Great War. Nations of this type which, happily for the world, are diminishing in number, ever seek to despoil other nations of what is by right

theirs. But while the aggressive nations are a menace to the peace of the world, they develop a strong group spirit through a common feeling of what they regard as their national pride and a feverish desire for national expansion at the expense of some weaker nations. The pacific type may be exemplified by China. The Chinese nation has no desire for aggression; all it asks for is merely to be allowed to work out unhampered its own destiny. While conscious of their corporate existence as a nation, the Chinese people do not foster the type of group spirit so much valued by a nation like the Japanese.

Our classification of social groups may now be tabulated as follows:-

I. Crowd:
  1. With physical presence—
    a. Mob
    b. Street accident spectators
    c. Theatre audience
  2. Without physical presence-
    A newspaper public

II. Club or Association:
  1. 'Several'
  2. 'Associative'

III. Community:
  1. Those based on kinship—
    a. Immediate,-The Family
    b. Remote,-Race
  2. Based on a common physical environment-
    a. Isolated,--Alpine village
    b. Populous,--Seaport town

  3. Based on a common civilisation-
    Western civilisation

IV. Nation :
  1. Aggressive
  2. Pacific

III.

INSTINCTIVE BASIS OF GROUP LIFE.

Though it is not possible to give an exhaustive list of all the instincts of man, as he has more instincts than the lower creatures,[1] we may follow Dr Drever[2] in regarding the following as the main instinctive tendencies in man: 1.Flight from danger, 2.Attack and active resistance, 3.Hunting, 4.Gregariousness, 5.Acquisitiveness, 6.Inquisitiveness, 7.The bipolar self-tendency, towards self-display or self-abasement. These principal instincts are sometimes divided into those relating to individual experience and those relating to social life. But a moment's reflection will show that as a matter of fact all innate tendencies, whether belonging to the "appetite" or "instinct" order, have a social significance greater than appears probable at first sight.[3] For example, of our "appetite" tendencies, none seems more individualistic than hunger and thirst, the satisfaction of which is an individual affair, and yet these two tendencies play a conspicuous part in the social life of man, from the crowded city restaurants to a family dinner party. In regard to the instincts of flight, hunting, pugnacity, acquisitiveness, and inquisitiveness, we may find their appropriate stimuli in men or in lower creatures or in inanimate things, as the case may be. But at all events, their operation involves social relations of some kind, although we have to note that gregariousness, the instincts

1. James, Principles, Vol.II p.393.
2. Psychology of Everyday Life, p.27
3. Instinct in Man, 1917, p.169

of self-assertion and self-abasement, and the parental instinct are even more exclusively confined to the sphere of social activities.

For our purpose, however, it is not sufficient simply to say that every innate tendency plays a part in the social life of man. It is necessary to specify those instincts which lie, as it were, at the root of human society, especially in its organised forms. It is generally agreed that pure instincts unmodified by experience are exceedingly rare and, in the case of man, almost impossible to find. All we can say is that in general those innate dispositions which we obviously share with the gregarious animals are ~~almost~~ more purely instinctive than those which we do not share to the same extent, and that the further down the scale of organic life they are to be found, the earlier they must have appeared in our evolutionary past. Partly guided by these considerations and partly by introspective analysis and observation, we proceed to enumerate such innate dispositions as have a more direct bearing on human society. Our attempt may probably be justified by the fact that, with the notable exception of the work done by McDougall, hitherto group-psychology as distinguished from crowd-psychology has not received the attention it deserves.

The dispositions relating to group life may be conveniently treated under two separate heads, namely, (1) those bearing upon the internal structure and organisation of the group; and (2) those bearing upon the exter-

external relations of the group. Of the two the latter are more directly concerned with the subject of group consciousness, but since the two classes are really inseparable in actual practice, it is necessary to deal with both.

With regard to the internal structure of the group, one may recognise the following principal instincts: 1. The Herd or Gregarious Instinct, 2. The Solitary instinct, 3. The Sociable Instinct with its triple manifestation in suggestibility, imitation, and sympathy, 4. "Take a Lead"[1] Instinct, 5. "Give a Lead"[1] Instinct, 6. The Instinct of Emulation.

It is generally agreed that the herd instinct is the fundamental basis of all social activities, since it is primarily ~~due~~ to this motive force that the fundamental fact of human beings seeking each other's company for its own sake is to be attributed. Thus McDougall accounts for the rise of large towns by the operation of this instinct rather than the economic necessities of modern industrialism. He says,[2] "In China where industry persists almost entirely in the form of handicrafts and

1. These two terms are taken from Graham Wallas (cf. The Great Society), roughly corresponding to McDougall's instincts of 'self-assertion' and 'self-abasement', but they are preferable to the latter on the ground that they seem to suggest more explicitly leadership and obedience to it —an essential feature in group life.
2. Social Psychology, p. 297.

where economic conditions are extremely different from our own, we find towns like Canton containing three million inhabitants crowded together even more densely than ~~than~~ in London and under conditions no less repulsive". The operation of this instinct is manifested in a feeling of 'restlessness' when isolated from one's fellows, i.e., in a disposition to seek relief from this uncomfortable feeling that arises spontaneously in the absence of of its appropriate stimulus. Dr Drever[1] rightly calls attention to the fact that for this reason as well as for its being comparatively less modifiable than the other instincts, gregariousness exhibits something of the nature of the 'appetites' in the sense that it is one of these tendencies which "originate, as it were, within us, in an affective experience we have".[3] But as he has nevertheless classified gregariousness under "the specific 'instinct' tendencies"[2] which appear to correspond to what he designates in a later work[3] "reactive tendencies", we may place this instinct on the border-line between the 'appetitive' and 'reactive' tendencies.

"Solitary confinement", says James,[4] "is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilised countries to adopt". But it has actually been experimented with in some parts of the United States as a method of punishment under the name of the 'Phila-

1. Instinct in Man, p. 185
2. op. cit. p. 169
3. Psychology of Everyday Life, p. 22.
4. Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 430

"Philadelphia plan". This plan consists of condemning a prisoner to absolute solitude both day and night, at work and rest. The effect of such treatment is so dreadful that one competent observer has said, "I speak this in sincere earnest, being of opinion after much patient investigation of the subject, both in North and South America and elsewhere, that there is really no torture more severe, even to a virtuous mind, than absolute solitude, and that to one which has nothing but vice in its retrospect, the misery becomes absolutely unbearable". Correlated to this dread of prolonged solitude is the special sensitiveness of the gregarious animal to all stimuli coming from the herd. To begin with, all gregarious animals not only possess an infallible power of recognising their fellows, but in some cases actually appear te be quite insensible to any stimulus from sources outside the herd. For example, Dr and Mrs Peckham report their fruitless experiments on the power of hearing with a species of wasps known as the Vespas. "The wasps seem insensible to any noise we could produce by whistles of various degrees of shrillness". "This of course," they carefully added, "does not show that they cannot hear, and any one who had been unfortunate enough to disturb them in the neighbourhood of their nest will remember how their angry buzzing seemed to serve as a battle cry to gather all the members of the clan for the attack". An ancient Chinese parable illustrates the same truth in regard to cattle. It says that cows have no ear for the most exquisite music played on the guitar,

1. Captain Basil Hall, quoted by T. Mott Osborne, Society and Prisons, Yale Univ. Press, p. 99

2-Wasps, Social and Solitary, p. 9

but as soon as the cry of a lonely calf is uttered , they raise their ears to listen all the more attentively. On the human level of development, writers like Mr Trotter[1] has drawn attention to the fact that the voice of the herd is the most potent guide of behaviour.

It would, however , be a mistake to over-emphasise the rôle of the herd instinct in human behaviour, whatever it may have achieved for animal societies. Its proper function can be best understood as being restricted to the first realisation of man's social life, i.e., as the bare fact of producing vast human aggregates of an entirely undeterminate character. Hence the herd instinct manifests itself in gregariousness and no more. As to how any human society, once called into being by the operation of the herd instinct, is maintained and made a stepping-stone for further advance, we must ascribe it to some other specific instincts which, though closely related to, yet must not be confused with, the gregarious tendency as such. It will be seen that our contention implies the denial of the view that suggestion, imitation, and sympathy are simply different aspects of the herd instinct. Many facts may be adduced in our support. Firstly, gregariousness, as McDougall[2] says, "does not necessarily imply sociability of temperament" as may be evidenced by the 'solitary' and 'unsociable' life of many Londoners who yet do not take kindly to living in the country. The well-known Demaraland oxen as described by Galton[3] are clearly

1. Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.
2. Social psychology, p. 87.
3. Enquiries into Human Faculty, 1883, p. 71 et seq. quoted by McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 84

gregarious without being sociable. Secondly, the operation of the herd instinct in i$ts pure form has nothing to do with active sympathy or altruistic feeling. Thus wolves and cattle even go to the length of persecuting a wounded or weakly member of the pack or herd. Thirdly, the existence of what James calls 'contrary impulses' is nowhere more indubitable than in human nature. The gregarious instinct in man is no exception to the rule, for its great strength is counteracted by what we may designate the solitary instinct, which falls to be considered next.

The gregarious instinct is not equally strong with different races of mankind. Even in Europe alone, one finds such marked differences in this respect between the Nordic and the Mediterranean races as may be illustrated by the corresponding differences in their artistic achievements.[1] Obviously there are even more striking differences in the strength of this instinct in different individuals, even though they may be of the same nationality. We may go further and say that while no race of men may be properly described as solitary, every individual is alternately gregarious and solitary. Münsterberg[2] attempts to show that "the desire for solitude is the artificial product of a refined society" and that it arises as "a reaction against the animal impulses of the masses". Indeed, there is no doubt that solitude comes to be more valued with higher development of the intellect. But it would be wrong not to regard the desire for solitude as equally instinc-

1. McDougall, National Welfare and National Decay, 1921, p.95
2. Psychology, General and Applied, p.252.

tive, especially when one bears in mind that, if our species were originally evolved from the anthropoid stock through the adoption of a hunting life, the pack as such would not favour gregariousness apart from the requirements of co-operative hunting. Moreover, with all normal men there is a genuine recurrent desire to be ~~left~~ alone as a welcome alternative to social intercourse. James[1] has practically recognised the existence of a solitary instinct, or at all events ~~of the~~ imperfect gregariousness of man. "With many persons" he says "the first impulse when the door-bell rings or a visitor is suddenly announced is to scuttle out of the room so as not to be 'caught'! When a person at whom we have been looking becomes aware of us, our immediate impulse is to look the other way, and pretend we have not seen him. Many friends have confessed to me that this is a frequent phenomenon with them in meeting acquaintances in the street, especially unfamiliar ones. The bow is a secondary correction of the primary feint that we do not see the other person". These phenomena James attributes to 'shyness'. But it appears to be at least as much due to the instinctive tendency to solitude. For if man were perfectly and completely gregarious at all times, why should such a contrary impulse to run away or to conceal one's self from one's fellows so often assert itself in the absence of logical grounds for so doing? Our point of view has been more explicitly stated by Graham Wallas[2], who says that "the desire for privacy"

1. Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 433
2. Human Nature in Politics, p. 46

is"sufficiently marked to approach the character of a specific instinct". "Most men", continues this writer, "will not tolerate the frequent repetition of that adjustment of the mind and sympathies to new acquaintanceship a certain amount of which is so refreshing and necessary". We may conclude that apart from nervous fatigue or any other physiological causes, social intercourse in the case of human beings can only yield instinctive satisfaction up to a certain point, beyond which the contrary impulse to seek solitude begins more and more to assert itelf that in the end it may even become positively disagreeable to be compelled to keep company. It is common experience that while in solitude one longs for company and yet when in company one sighs for solitude again. The two instincts, the gregarious and the solitary, operate in a complementary manner. Sir Martin Conway speaks at length of the manner in which the individual is so completly absorbed in the 'crowd' that he utterly loses his sense of self-identity. But it is by the recognition of a specific solitary instinct as the individual asserting himself and thus escaping from the tyranny of his gregarious habits that one can understand how social progress is ever possible. For the desire te be alone may lead to opportunities for calm reflection such as are not to be found in the heat and rush of social intercourse. The truth of this will be still more evident when we remember that every great advance in human history first originated in the mind of one individual who communicated it to others

1. The Crowd in Peace and War, p.26

his invention or discovery, which through the contagion of example came to secure the co-operation of the masses for its general adoption and further elaboration.

The solitary instinct must have far-reaching concequences on the growth of group consciousness. It is only in virtue of a healthy balance between the instinctive satisfaction of gregariousness on the one hand and of solitude on the other that any kind of group spirit of social value can develop at all.

Next we come to consider the three instinctive tendencies sometimes spoken of simply as different aspects of the herd instinct. But having already marked out the legitimate sphere of activity of the herd instinct, it is now proposed to place imitation, suggestibility, and sympathy together under a single disposition which we will call the sociable instinct. This name is chosen because of the fact that, when the gregarious impulse has brought a number of isolated individuals together, the first mark of sociability can be no other than acting, believing, and feeling as others act, believe, and feel. It may be noted that James[1] used the term 'sociability' to mean gregariousness. But it seems only a difference of terminology, since James[2] had in another passage treated of sympathy and imitation under as "specific human instincts", not merely as appendages of the gregarious instinct.

Though imitation, suggestibility, and sympathy are equally characteristic of the sociable instinct, suggestibility must be regarded as fundamental. For unless the cognitive aspect of this instinct is first stimulated, it will be impossible to evoke its affective and motor responses. Even at the risk of dissecting the unity of consciousness, we have to recognise, for clear-

1. Principles, Vol. II., p.430
2. op.cit., p.40, and p.410

clearness' sake, a time order in every sociable act. Both Bagehot and Tarde have regarded imitation as fundamental, and suggestibility, one may suppose, simply as imitation in the sphere of belief and opinion. But such a view seems to have resulted merely from using the word imitation in an unusually wide sense, and no purpose can be served by thus obscuring the proper function of suggestibility. In the last analysis an idea or belief must be first suggested from without before it can be acted upon so as to produce a truly imitative act.

Dr W.H.R.Rivers has proposed "to use the term suggestion, not as a name for the cognitive aspect of the herd instinct, but as a comprehensive term for the whole process whereby one mind acts upon another 'unwittingly'". A mental state is described as 'unwitting' "when a thought or feeling comes into the mind without antecedents in consciousness so that we suppose it to have come from the unconscious". Dr Rivers employs the terms 'intuition', 'mimesis', and 'sympathy' to represent the three aspects of 'suggestion' in his sense of the word. While agreeing with him in thus clearly distinguishing the 'unwitting' processes of imitation, suggestion, and sympathy from those of a 'witting' character, for our purpose it would be more appropriate to retain the old meaning of suggestion as defined by McDougall, and at the same time to place it, along with imitation and sympathy,

1. Excluding, of course, what Baldwin calls 'self-imitation'.
2. Instinct and the Unconscious, p.91
3. op.cit., p.16
4. op.cit., p.92 et seq.
5. cf. Soc.Psy., p.97, "Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance."

under one comprehensive instinct of sociability.

A great deal ~~deal~~ has already been written on suggestion both in abnormal and normal psychology. But two things in this connection must be clearly stated. Firstly, suggestion in group life is not necessarily associated with abnormal mental states, except probably on the crowd level and under certain special circumstances. We may say that much of the content of group consciousness represents the cumulative effect of repeated suggestion. Secondly, of the main conditions favouring suggestibility, such as prestige of its source, fatigue in the subject, etc., by far the most important condition in group life is the weight of numbers in deciding the acceptance of any suggestion. The belief that many people, preferably fellow-members of the same group, have entertained a certain idea or acted in a certain way is sufficient in itself to induce one to think or act likewise with a warm feeling of conviction, and not infrequently even in opposition to one's real wishes and interests. In an organised group the effect of numbers in heightening suggesbility is also one of the main factors in preserving the unity of the group when divergent interests should arise among its members. Indeed, one may say that all democractic social and political organisation based on the rule of the majority ultimately derives its psychological justification from this remarkable power of mere numbers in enhancing suggesbility.

The rôle of imitation is, as already stated, a secondary one. But this does not mean a denial of its importance, inasmuch as a belief, if uncritically accepted without issuing out in overt action, would be devoid of social significance in that it would remain a bare idea.

M.Tarde[1] maintains that society originated "on the day when one man copied another".This view has been criticized as the inversion of the truth that "man imitates because he is social;he is not social because he imitates".[2] In our view we would prefer to say that man imitates because he is suggestible,and that he is both suggestible and imitative because he is sociable.Tarde's well-known law of imitation from within to without--ab interioribus ad exteriora[3]--in reality lends further support to our treatment of suggestibility as the most fundamental aspect of the sociable process,since a suggested idea which is'within' becomes'without' only when it issues out in overt action.

Sympathy does not necessarily depend on imitation and may be simply regarded as the affective tone of a suggested idea or belief.A social animal experiences a sympathetic reaction upon the perception of the expression of another's feeling.This is what is called 'primitive sympathy',which is to be distinguished from 'active sympathy'or the desire for the society of those who share our dominant feeling or emotion.In group life both forms of sympathy play a part according to its level of development.Thus in the crowd,it is the primitive sympathy, and in an organised group of the club type,it is the active sympathy, that is chiefly appealed to.

A recent writer[4] has pointed out the inadequacy of McDougall's electrical analogy when he speaks of

1.Laws of Imitation,p.28
2.Hetherington and Muirhead,Social Purpose,p.76
3.Laws of Imitation,Chap.VI.
4.Frank Watts,Abnormal Psychology,p.,34

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"~~the~~ sympathetic induction of emotion", since electrical induction "sets up such lines of forces as tend to produce opposing currents to the inducing currents" In doing so, he prefers to liken the spread of sympathy to ripples of water created by a stone thrown into it. But it seems that no physical analogy can satisfactorily illustrate sympathetic contagion, especially as we have no reason to suppose that its progress is marked by a uniform rate in all directions similar to electrical currents or ripples of water. With probably more truth it may be said that sympathy spreads in an irregular manner, meeting obstacles here and there in its progress. Mobs and crowds often show irrational unanimity of feeling through its rapid transmission from one member to another. But even at the crowd level surely not every individual in the crowd shares the same feeling to the same degree at the same rate. In highly organised groups the critical self is constantly awake to combat the suggestible self in every member; and it is only when the former is overwhelmed by the intensity and volume of sympathetic contagion that it finally surrenders itself to its influence. With gregarious animals it is essential that all members of a herd should immediately respond to a common emotion so that in the face of sudden danger no time should be lost in securing uniformity of behaviour either in flight or some means of defence. But civilised mankind is marked by a disposition to pause and think as much as by a disposition to emotional suggesbility.

The tendencies to 'take a lead' and to 'give a lead' combine to represent the bipolarity of the self-tendency. They are both essential to the internal cohesion

1. Soc. Psy., p. 92.

of group life, since no organised group can exist without leadership and obedience to leadership. With regard to the tendency to 'take a lead', it is exhibited by gregarious animals as may be illustrated by Darwin's[1] description of the Abyssinian baboons. When these creatures "plunder a garden", "they silently follow their leader; and if an impudent young animal makes a noise, he receives a slap from the others to teach him silence and obedience." With the notable exception of certain birds which are said to have attained "a oneness of mind"[2] without requiring a leader, every pack or herd or flock that travels has its recognised leader, who demands obedience from all. We may go so far as to say that not only is this the case, but that to some extent every individual member, from the recognised leader downwards, alternately leads, and is led by, some of its fellows. This is nowhere more clearly seen than in the hierarchic relationship of leaders and led among the dogs on the South American pampas. Among them, from the foremost in strength and power down to the weakest there is a gradation of authority; every one knows just how far he can go, which companion he can bully when he is in a bad temper or wishes to assert himself, and to which he must humbly yield in his turn"[3]. What is true of these dogs is equally true of human beings, with the important difference that in the case of the latter, leadership is, with the progress of civilisation, no longer established by prowess in fighting. Thus in every human group of some

1. The Descent of Man.
2. W.H. Hudson, A Naturalist in La Plata, p.335
3. Op.cit., p.336

permanence every member enters into definite relationship with all the others implicitly in terms of leadership or obedience as the case may be. There are people to whose opinions we habitually defer, though not invariably, while there are others who in their turn are accustomed to defer to our views and ideas. Apart from questions of prestige or convictions of superiority, many of the conditions determining such hierarchic relationship are still obscure; with certain people they seem to be naturally tuned to one another after some pre-established plan, into the mystery of which the human intellect has not yet penetrated. All that we can say is that the bipolar tendency to 'take a lead' and to 'give a lead' reacts in a truly instinctive manner to appropiate stimuli. It is probably for this very reason that even where definite relations of leader and led have been established, it does not follow that the same leader will always be obeyed. He is obeyed only when he produces the appropiate stimulus; and we habitually obey him because he usually succeeds in so doing.

Emulation plays an important part in all group life; it serves the useful purpose of maintaining the continued existence of a group whenever a new leader has to be recruited from the ranks of the led. In human groups the authority of the leader is never absolute, exeept where it is maintained by extraneous conditions such as the employment of physical force to exact obedience.

We may divide the external relations of a social group into: (1) with individuals outside the group, (2) with similar groups, and (3) with dissimilar groups. In all these various relations, the one dominant instinct is that of group self-preservation. This instinct manifests itself in very different ways according to circumstances.

In the relations of a group with outside individuals, two bipolar tendencies are of importance. One consists of secretiveness and ~~assimilation~~ communicativeness. In the presence of any individual who does not belong to one's group, the characteristic mental state is a vague feeling of estrangement and unfamiliarity even where the person concerned may in all other respects be perfectly familiar. This feeling is by no means transient or easily overcome, but it rather becomes a sentiment that may be evoked whenever the idea of such a person as an outsider to the group should in any way come into one's consciousness. The characteristic behaviour in such a case takes the form of secretiveness, i.e., in a disposition to conceal from the stranger all or most of the facts regarding the organisation and activities of one's particular group. This is especially pronounced when we are in the presence of any one who is apparently well-qualified to become a member of our group and yet continues to keep aloof from it. The instinct of secretiveness may be explained by an unconscious fear of the outsider as a possible source of danger to the welfare of the group, since it is clear that he does not share our common weal and woe, and there is a probability that his interests may conflict with those of our group. If that be the case, secretiveness is only one aspect of the more comprehensive instinct of group self-preservation.

Though secretiveness often characterises our attitude to individuals who do belong to the same group as ourselves, the opposite tendency to display in their presence our collective strength or power derived from our membership of our club or community is under certain circumstances equally well-marked. We find instinctive

satisfaction in parading before a stranger the advantages conferred upon us by our group, especially if he appears to have been visibly impressed with our collective power and prestige. Another way of looking upon this tendency is simply to regard it as an extension of individual self-assertion, since we tend to identify our individual selves with our group, and therefore the glorification of our group is in reality an extension of our individual self-display. Herein lies the true nature of group consciousness, at any rate its instinctive basis.

The other bipolar tendency takes the form of exclusion and assimilation. When encountering a stranger to our group, we feel an impulse either to exclude him from, or to absorb him into, its membership as the case may be. The instinct of exclusion operates at all levels of group life. Even such a comparatively fortuitous and ephemeral group like the travellers on board a liner, who have become more or less acquainted with one another during the first part of the voyage, can hardly avoid a vague feeling of incipient hostility towards a new passenger who joins the ship at some intermediate port of call. In an organised group, the impulse to exclude a new applicant for its membership is, as often as not, first experienced by the members in the entire absence of logical grounds for it. In other words there is a distinct tendency for all groups to develop a coterie or clique spirit that manifests itself in an irrational and vague dislike of anyone breaking in upon their exclusive circle. This fact is of importance in understanding the aberrations of the group spirit, which we will reserve for later consideration.

The opposite tendency to induce an outsider to become a member of our group is especially marked in our attitude to anyone who is in a certain degree considered superior to ourselves. Our belief in his superiority originates in us a desire to identify his name with our group, and the most unmistakable way of achieving this is to be able to say that he is one of its members like ourselves. It seems to be for this reason that Denmark and Iceland have never ceased to contend for the honour of having produced Thorwaldsen, the sculptor who excecuted the bust of Byron now at Cambridge.

Our attitude to any group similar to our own is largely determined by the instinct of group self-preservation. As a similar group, by the very reason of its having clearly defined interests of its own similar to those of ourselves, is liable to conflict with the free activities of our group, our instinctive impulse towards it is one of incipient hostility, which is only kept in check by considerations of law and order. Thus it is said that at one time the cricket matches between Eton and Harrow usually ended in a scrimmage. Similarly, neighbouring towns or neighbouring countries often regard each other with no friendly eye. Side by side with this instinctive hatred of similar groups arises a heightened feeling of warmth and friendliness towards all fellow-members of one's own group.

Of course it is perfectly possible for two or more similar groups to co-operate for their larger welfare, but in so doing, they psychologically become one group with separate organisations. Besides, in such a case, rational factors would largely modify the instinctive behaviour of which we have spoken. The instinctive impulse

of one group towards another similar to itself is always and everywhere characterised by a vague fear of possible injury that may be inflicted by the latter. This fear gives rise to endless mutual suspicion which, if unchecked, would sooner or later break out in open hostility. Despite every reason to the contrary, no group can cease to hate or suspect a similar group until One of the three things occurs:- It may absorb its rival by way of amalgamation; or it may be powerful enough to disperse the other group so that it no longer exists; or it may come to a working understanding with the other group by way of affiliation, or alliance. As none of these may be completely realised in the relations between one nation and another, some other means must be discovered if we are to end once for all the instinctive hatred and suspicion that undoubtedly exists between rival national groups. On the success of this quest depends the lasting peace of the world, which is emphatically far more a psychological problem than anything else.

The relations of dissimilar groups may be briefly stated. There is usually an attitude of mild toleration or frank indifference in such cases. But as soon as any similarity of interest should ever arise between such groups, the instinct of group self-preservation tends to be stirred into activity, and the same phenomena as exist between similar groups may be repeated, only possibly with less intensity. Hence we may lay down as a principle that the instinctive hostility between one group and another varies in direct proportion to their similarity of aims, methods, and organisation. If, as it sometimes happens, similar groups organise themselves into a federation ~~for~~ for greater efficiency in common action, such behaviour is not instinctive, but the result of rational considerations.

IV.

THE CONCEPTION OF THE GROUP MIND.

We have seen that he bond that unites individuals in a social group is everywhere a psychical bond in the nature of common feelings and willings. The question now arises: Does the group possess a mind in the same sense as when we speak of the mind of an individual person? Or to put it in a different form: Does the group collectively think, feel, and act as a group-individual?

Before we can deal with this question, a prior question has to be answered : What is a mind? According to McDougall,[1] "a mind" is "an organised system of mental or purposive forces". At the lowest level, the mob or the crowd is extremely unstable, fickle, and liable to be swayed by coarse emotions. Obviously it would not be warranted by the facts before us to attribute the existence of a system of mental forces to such a fortuitous assemblage. For our purpose therefore we have to ascend in the scale of group life to see if any social group exhibits such a highly integrated system of purposive forces as to point clearly to its having a collective mind of its own. The modern nation may be such a group, and if it were not, we should fail to find the manifestation of a collective mind anywhere. At the first glance a nation is no more than the aggregate of all its individual members; and the fact that they are welded together by common traditions, sentiments, and ideals does not justify the creation of a group mind over and above the minds

1-Psychology, (Home Univ. Library) p. 229

of the individuals composing the nation. If the nation as a whole experiences a certain unanimity of thought and feeling in any given situation, it is still each individual that participates in, and contributes to, the national thoughts and feelings and renders these what they are. Now the community of tradition, sentiments, and ideals of a group may be best observed, not as it is, but in its dynamic and functional aspects. Hence it will be necessary to examine briefly the doctrine of the general will as expressed in the collective deliberation of a nation.

"There is", declares Rousseau,[1] "often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter regards only the common interests, while the former has regard to private interests and is merely a sum of particular wills; but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses which cancel one another and the general will remains as the sum of differences". As there is always a possibility that the pluses may not cancel all the minuses, Rousseau apparently assumes the predominance of those who will the common good. Thus interpreted, McDougall regards it as "an approximation towards the truth",[2] but further on[3] in dealing with the will of the nation, he combats Rousseau's view on the ground that "it is absurd to maintain that the general will is but the blind resultant of the conflict of the individual wills striving after private ends and unconscious of the ends and purposes of the nation". From this we may infer that McDougall's own doctrine would appear

1. The Social Contract, Eng, trans. H. J. Tozer, p. 123
2. The Group Mind, p. 53
3. op. cit. p. 161

to be that the general will expresses itself when every individual in a group keeps before his mind the idea of the group as a whole and indentifies his personal interest with the common interest of the group. The general will thus conceived, resembles what Bosanquet calls "the real will" as contrasted with the "actual will". But there is one important difference in the fact that the "real will" is supposed to be a rational or ideal will, in many cases even unknown to the individual himself when he makes a conscious choice. This "real will" then may be regarded as the general will embodied in the State, whose claims are higher than those of any individual as such on the ground that it alone always has regard for the true interests of the individual himself, even though he may be quite unaware of them. The evil practical consequences of postulating a "real will" have been vigorously stated by L.T. Hobhouse.[1] He points out that as no part in me is more real than another, such a doctrine sets up the State as "an entity superior and indifferent to component individuals"; and "it becomes a false god". His arguments are so convincing that we may definitely discard Bosanquet's "real will" as both unverifiable and mischievous. Let us therefore confine our attention to the general will as McDougall seems to mean by it.

If we are to look for the general will in the collective mental life of a nation, it is evident that we will not find it in the vague impulses and self-inconsistent ideas of the masses who constitute the bulk

1. The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 136

of any nation.Accordingly,we have to turn to its organised bodies for collective deliberation such as its parliament of elected representitives of the people.Here it may be thought that Rousseau's idea of pluses and minuses cancelling each other to the ultimate triumph of the general will is seen in actual practice, as for example in the rule of the majority whenever votes are taken. But as a matter of fact, the case is by no means so simple.To begin with,we have no reason to suppose that any parliamentary minority is actuated by selfish motives. In fact the few who vote against a certain measure may well happen to be the more enlightened section of the assembly.Moreover,if the so-called crowd-psychology contains any truth for us,it will be instructive to bear in mind what Le Bon[1] says on the subject.This writer avers that parliamentary assemblies are by no means free from such crowd characteristics as 'intellectual simplicity','irritability','suggestibility','the exageration of the sentiments and the preponderating influence of a few leaders'.The point he emphasises is that parliamentary assemblies are suggestible in a high degree in regard to all matters with the sole exception of purely local questions on which the member concerned may be expected to have definite views of his own.Le Bon's view seems to be well attested by actual facts. In the nature of things,indeed we can hardly expect it to be otherwise.To begin with,not all members are equally

1.The Crowd,pp.215-216

well acquainted with the facts regarding any definite issue before them;and lack of knowledge,it is generally agreed,facilitates suggestion.Secondly,we have no reason to suppose that every member is equally interested in all questions as they arise.Thirdly,the long sittings of parliaments,sometimes lasting all night and day,cannot but cause great mental and physical strain.It is said that "any cause...which prevents a man from giving full attention to his mental processes" can be the source of "non-rational inferences in an extreme degree"[1].Now fatigue is decidedly one of the most potent causes in producing such an effect.Finally,however we may idealise the goodness of the general will,in actual practice different individuals cannot,if only by reason of their different training and outlook upon life,avoid holding divergent views as to what constitutes the highest interests of the nation.The long and fierce debates that form almost a daily feature of a parliament in session,on the assumption that every member is sincerely solicitous for the national welfare,should convince us that this is so. Again,members of parliament are elected on the supposition that they represent their respective constituencies on all questions that arise.In their representative capacity, they are under the existing system empowered to decide all questions without referring them to their own constituencies.That being so,what the people's representative regard as the highest national interest may not not at all coincide with the views of the people whom

1.Human Nature in Politics,p.110

he is supposed to represent. Hence at best there is only what may be taken as an imperfectly-interpreted general will; and under the existing system as obtains in modern democracies, it is extremely doubtful if the general will of the people themselves can ever be ascertained, or if indeed there is a general will at all. We are accordingly driven to the conclusion that there is no positive evidence in favour of the existence of such an entity as the group mind, and that, if it exists at all, it can be only at a comparatively low level, since, as we have seen, true collective volition is still no more than a pious ideal.

However, it will not be easy to set aside the arguments in support of the conception of the group mind. To begin with, a nation is essentially a psychological entity, and the bonds uniting its individual members are psychical bonds. It has its established traditions and institutions; and in spite of all, it does appear to cherish certain collective ideals and purposes which underlie all national actions and reflect in fuller measure the ideals and purposes of its individual members. The fact that no single individual can comprehend the collective scheme in its entirety does not prove the non-existence of the group mind. It only shows that society enjoys a continuity of life such as none of its short-lived individual members does, so that each can assimilate no more than certain aspects of the infinitely larger life and wider aims of society. Even a writer like Maciver who is strongly opposed to the conception of the group mind cannot avoid remarking, "Society like the kingdom of God is within us. Within us, within each

1. Community, pp., 83-84

of us, and yet greater than the thoughts and understandings of any one of us....As a community grows in civilisation and culture, its traditions are no longer clear and definite ways of thinking, its usages are no longer uniform, its spirit is no longer to be summed up in a few phrases. But the spirit and tradition become no less real in becoming more complex. Each member no longer embodies the whole tradition, but it is because each embodies some part of a greater tradition to which the freely-working individuality of each contributes". In any case, the individual as completely isolated from all social relations does not exist. As a member of society, he is literally no more than part of a larger whole, in spite of his apparent autonomy. Since the contents of of the individual consciousness are directly taken over from the social ideals and sentiments, and since society as a whole is always much more than the sum of its members existing at any one time, the conception of the group mind as something that exists in and along with the individual minds is not only plausible but necessary for social psychology. The true ground for such an assumption may be sought in the fact that, as a member of a group, the individual thinks, feels, and acts differently from his behaviour in isolation; and these differences, which are emphatically mental differences, cannot be dismissed simply as the sum of individual minds reacting upon one another within the group. Every social group of some degree of permanence develops a group-individuality which is something impalpable, yet infinitely real. It is unanalysable; and as partially manifested in the mind of each individual member, it exercises a powerful influence on his behaviour. Unless we attribute a collective mind to the group as a whole, how else are we to account for such

facts?

But to return to our previous discussion of the collective will of a nation,we have seen little or no evidence for it;and if not in a modern nation,no other group of less permanence can be said to have it.The essence of mind is its conative tendencies which on the human level of development issue out in truly volitional acts.In the absence of true collective volition,it is difficult to posit a collective mind.On the other hand,however,group life cannot be understood except in terms of mind.The group as a group compounds and transforms all the separate systems of individual mental forces and renders them other than what they are in isolation.Unless we believe in the reality of the group mind as something that exists in and along with its individual component minds,it would be quite impossible to explain the collective behaviour of men as members of a group.The group mind is not merely the sum of its individual component minds."It is ", writes McDougall,"the organised group as such,which exists only or chiefly in the persons of those composing it,but which does not exist in the mind of any one of them,and which operates upon each so powerfully first because it is something indefinitely greater,more powerful,more comprehensive than the mere sum of these individuals."

The conclusion we finally reach is that the conception of the group mind is indispensable to social psychology,not only in regard to highly organised groups of the club and community types,but also to a large extent the collective mental life of the simple mob or

1.The Group Mind,p.12

crowd. We accept this conception, however, with one important qualification, namely, that the group mind as manifested in collective volition is, even in the most highly organised groups, still at a comparatively very low level of development. Referring to the group mind, Maciver asks, "Does the system so created think and will and feel and act?" To this McDougall replies that it "does all of these things". We have seen reasons for modifying these claims made for it. The group mind certainly feels and to some extent thinks, but hardly at all wills and acts in the sense of true collective volition. It may be said that on the outbreak of a war, each of the opposing nations unanimously decides to enter the struggle with one will. But a little reflection shows that the alleged unanimity is more apparent than real; and the momentous deliberations over the question of war or neutrality before the opening of the hostilities are in every case the work of a small group of men carried on in such a parliamentary atmosphere as already described, and therefore cannot in any true sense be called collective will. The group mind is therefore to be looked upon both as a working hypothesis for the interpretation of group behaviour and as a lofty ideal which has so far not yet been completely realised anywhere in human society. To speak metaphorically, we have the roots and branches of such a mind, but so far its finest fruits have yet to be borne.

For a clear conception of the group mind, it will be necessary to examine briefly into the hypothesis of collective consciousness as put forward by Espinas, Fouillée, Schaeffle, and others. Mainly on the analogy of

1. Community, p. 76
2. The Group Mind, p. 10

the nerve cells in the individual brain structure representing independent psychical units grouped together as a functional unit in all conscious phenomena, it is claimed that the individual members of a group likewise fuse and merge their separate consciousnesses into a collective consciousness. The collective consciousness of the group, as it were, absorbs the individual minds as its constituent cells. This theory is further supported by the fact that certain multicellular organisms, as Espinas[1] has shown, are divisible into parts, each of which can independently continue to live, grow, and propagate its species. Ascending in the scale of animal life, we meet with the familiar instances of the bee-hive and the ant colony. In each hive or colony, these creatures show a striking unanimity of behaviour which may be attributed to some form of collective consciousness that has its physical basis in their common descent from a queen. On the human level there are cases of multiple personality due to the dissociation of consciousness, such as the well-known story of Miss Beauchamp described by Morton Prince. These being undeniable facts, it is argued that a group of men associated together may be equally regarded as having

1. Des Sociétés Animales, 1877, pp. 363-364. "A ne considérer que les sociétés animales, voici ce que nous trouvons. Premièrement, et même chez les animaux qu'aucun lien organique n'a jamais réunis, chez les membres d'une même peuplade, par exemple, une telle solidarité de sentiments que la crainte d'un extrême péril ne réussit pas toujours à en empêcher la manifestation. Leur attachement va jusqu'à la mort. Ne voit-on pas que cet cet entraînement irréfléchi serait impossible si le moi de chacun n'embrassait véritablement celui de tous les autres, si le sentiment que chacun a de lui-même n'était dominé par le sentiment qu'il a de la communauté? C'est qu'en effet la conscience chez les animaux n'est pas une chose absolue, indivisible."

a collective consciousness over and above their individual consciousnesses.

The group mind ,while in a sense transcending the individual minds,is emphatically not therefore an independent entity capable of functioning apart from the minds of its individual members.It is a vast synthesis of the mental forces operating within and throughout the group as a group,and not by any means independently of its individual component members.Hence it is inconceivable that there can be a super-individual consciousness.We cannot accept the hypothesis of the collectiveness on the ground that it is both unverifiable and unnecessary.It is unverifiable because we have so far no means whatever of ascertaining how the minds of individuals actually become fused in such a manner as to exhibit some greater and more comprehensive consciousness.Telepathy may be such a means of super-sensible intercommunication between individual minds,but that does not occur on such a large scale as to justify any belief in its universality.The hypothesis is not indispensable for the reason that the group mind can be best understood as a system of mental or purposive forces, which function,and is contained,within the individual component minds and nowhere else.

V.

## THE GROWTH OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS.

From the genetic point of view group consciousness must be regarded as a natural extension of self-consciousness, and as such it is a secondary product both in the development of the race and of the individual. Some writers are inclined to the view that with primitive men the dawn of group consciousness takes place before individual self-consciousness has had time to develop. For example, in describing "the infancy of societies", Sir Henry Maine says,[1] "Men are regarded and treated not as individuals but always as members of a particular group." Such a view seems plausible when one bears in mind the primitive conditions of life under which the savage is somewhat involuntarily led to the consciousness of his group rather than of himself as an individual. He is absolutely dependent upon his community both for his personal safety and means of subsistence; in his intercourse with other groups he is known, not by his individual name, but by the name of his tribe; he may be, and is usaully, held responsible by other groups for any injury done to them by any member of his tribe. But it may be pointed out that however completely absorbed in his group the savage may be, it is impossible for him to ignore his bodily appetites and sensations, feelings of pain or

1-Ancient Law, p. 183.

pleasure according as his instintive impulses are thwarted or satisfied. All these are in the nature of things individual experiences which cannot be shared with the rest of the group, and which must further strengthen the the acquisitive instinct of the savage as is manifested in his strong sense of private property in weapons, magical charms, and many other things. Furthermore, the exisistence of individual names in primitive communities, the feelings of vanity and jealousy which often lead to keen competition and rivalry, and the practice of private revenge as distinguished from the tribal feud, emphatically point to the individual self-consciousness of the savage. McDougall[1] suggests that, in the course of the evolution of the human mind, group consciousness and individual self-consciousness "must have been achieved by parallel processes which constantly reacted upon one another in reciprocal promotion." We are, however, inclined to believe that the natural order of development demands the precedence of the latter, just as unicellularity on the physical plane must have preceded multicellularity. The individual self acts in all cases as a centre of reference in the stream of perceptual experience even if we suppose that the savage mind does not attain to the conceptual level of development; and in the absence of such a centre of reference group consciousness can manifestly have no meaning even though it were possible.

The growth of self-consciousness furnishes

1. The Group Mind, p.66.

many parellels in the development of group consciousness and hence it may be said that the latter is not only an extension but in some sense and measure a repetition of the former process. According to Baldwin,[1] four stages in the former process may be roughly distinguished. At first, persons are barely distinguished from inanimate objects in the environment simply as moving objects from the fact that they minister to the physical needs of the infant. Next, a certain amount of capriciousness and irregularity is observed in the behaviour of different persons with whom the child comes in contact. The third stage is reached when, in spite of apparent irregularities, different individuals have been found by experience to exhibit certain characteristic modes of behaviour. This idea of personal character gradually induces the child to adopt different attitudes in the presence of different individuals. Finally, as a result of imitating the behaviour of others and thus more or less influencing it in any desired direction, the child acquires a sense of himself as an active agency. He thus comes to interpret the feelings and actions of other selves in terms of those of his own, and to regard them as "ejects" or persons like himself. This marks the beginning of his "social feeling" based on an appreciation of character. Full-blown self-consciousness implies the idea of the self as reflected in the feelings and actions of other selves. Along with this

1. Mental Development, p. 115 et seq.

idea of self is developed the self-regarding sentiment which alone enables the individual to make truly volitional choice and at times even to act in the line of the greatest resistance.[1] Similarly, as a member of a group the individual acquires not only the idea of his group as a whole, but what we may call a group-regarding sentiment. Just as the idea of self exercises in individual behaviour an effective control over the instinctive impulses, so the idea of the group and the sentiment it ~~it~~ evokes alone enable the social motives to triumph over purely egoistic motives. This may be exemplified by the action of the patriotic soldier sacrificing his life for his country's welfare—which, from a purely individualistic point of view, is obviously detrimental in the last degree to his personal welfare. Again, as a social product, the full development of individual self-consciousness depends on free intercourse with other selves. The same applies to group consciousness which in its turn depends largely on free intercourse with other, and especially similarly constituted, groups. In other words, just as individual self-knowledge is the key to self-consciousness, so group self-knowledge is the necessary stepping-stone to group consciousness which is primarily derived from our idea of our group as it exists in the minds of other groups.

The fact that group consciousness is an extension of individual self-consciousness will be still

1. cf. Social Psychology, Chap. VII.

more evident if we attempt to define the former as the identification of the self with the group as a whole and the sentiment of loyalty thus inspired to its tradition and welfare. James[1] has pointed out the difficulty of clearly distinguishing "me" from "mine", adding that "in the widest possible sense", a man's Self is the sum-total of all that he can call his." Accordingly, there is a splitting, as it were, of a man's Self into as many social selves as there are groups of which he regards himself as a member. The harmonious interrelation of these different selves representing different phases or aspects of the same personality is an important ethical question into which we have to examine more fully in a later connection. The point we have to reiterate here is that unless and until the group becomes completely identified with a part of ourselves, our attitude to it can only be one of indifference or detachment. Its welfare somehow appears external and remote when compared with those of our interests which are incorporated within the system of our self-regarding sentiment. Group consciuosness is therefore in reality enlarged self-consciousness with the important difference that active participation in group life necessarily involves certain mental forces and factors which can only be explained in terms of collective psychology. The most important of these new factors thus introduced

1. Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 291 et seq.

is the immense prestige of numbers with which the group as a whole invariably impresses upon the individual mind. This prestige is further strengthened by the existence in every permanent group of a stock of intellectual and moral tradition, since the knowlegde of all our fellow-members agreeing in the adoption of a certain attitude of mind or a certain line of conduct must profoundly affect the behaviour of ourselves as members of the same group. On the other hand, individual self-consciousness, however highly developed, lacks the steadying influence of such a bulwark of conduct. An individual as an individual is under the control of one ideal self, while it may be said that as one of a group he becomes aware of as many ideal selves as there are fellow-members all tending in the same direction and reinforcing one another with a force of momentum that can be seen nowhere except in collective feeling and action. Thus in its highest form group consciousness, while differing in no essential respect from extended self-consciousness, is nevertheless far more effective for our moral guidance than the latter by itself can ever be. The educational importance of the group spirit cannot therefore be overestimated.

We have defined group consciouness as the identification of the self with the group as a whole and the sentiment of loyalty thus inspired to its tradition ... welfare. Thus defined, it may be analysed into its two constituent elements: the idea of the group as identified

with the self plus the organised system of emotions centred upon that idea. The interesting question now arises as to how far a bare idea as an idea can determine our actual behaviour, especially as the current opinion among psychologists today seems to regard it as impotent in itself and therefore incapable of actively functioning without some emotional accompaniment. Graham Wallas dwells upon "the emotional power of bare words,"[1] and the creation of such emotion-charged symbols as the national flag and anthem and emblem in the task of nation-building.[2] "In general", says Stout,[3] "the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the ideal revival is not so intense; but apart from interfering conditions, it is generally present in some degree". It thus appears that all ideas are accompanied by a feeling-tone, however vague or faint. But if we believe the instinctive impulses to be the motive force of human action, we must still agree with Shand[4] that "many instincts of great individual importance and distinctness have no corresponding distinctive emotion". Hence it follows that an idea associated with, or derived from, such an instinctive impulse will in itself be more or less devoid of emotional colouring. This certainly applies to some extent

1. Human Nature in Politics, p.77.
2. op.cit., p.79.
3. Manual of Psychology, 1904, p.582.
4. The Foundations of Character, 1914, p.371.
Also approvingly quoted by Drever, Instinct in Man, p.159.

to individual human behaviour. We have, however, to determine how far it equally holds good in man's social relations. It seems that the idea of the group in itself will be a "cold and neutral intellectual perception", but when in the growth of group consciousness that idea becomes incorporated with the system of an extended self-regarding sentiment, we may provisionally conclude that the emotional association of such an idea must form a permanent feature quite inseparable from it.

The chief criterion of group consciousness seems to lie more in the strength of the group-regarding sentiment than in the vividness of the accompanying idea. This will be evident when we consider for a moment the mental life of the simple mob or crowd. As a member of such an unorganised assemblage, the individual is nevertheless vividly aware of the whole group, especially if it lies well within the range of his senses. But in such a case it will be impossible to speak of anything like a group-regarding sentiment, since in the nature of the case its formation requires time, knowledge, and organisation. The absence of such a sentiment is only too well illustrated by the fickleness, tendency to extremes, and excitability so characteristic of the ordinary crowd. But while this so is, nevertheless we have to note that normally both the idea and the sentiment attached to it develop in a parallel manner, gaining progressively as they do in vividness, concreteness, and intensity. A vague

idea evokes a correspondingly vague feeling; the intensity of the latter depends on the strength of the former Thus in the growth of group consciousness they really represent two aspects of a single mental process and can only be separated in an arbitrary manner.

The group spirit permanently moulds the mind and character of the individual as a member of his group, provided of course that it belongs to any of the higher groups in our classification. The way in which it operates is often so elusive that it defies analysis probably for the reason that it tends to become a firmly-fixed habit or a subconscious tendency in its influence on conscious behaviour. The public school boy or the fresher at ~~the~~ a university at first finds himself uncomfortably out of tune with his new surroundings, but in the course of time he enters more and more fully into the spirit of the group, and as a result he unquestioningly accepts certain moral and intellectual standards and even shares certain deep-seated prejudices entertained by the group as a whole. Very often he automatically acts in conformity with his group, and, in so doing, exhibits all the spontaneity and urgency characteristic, one may say, of instinctive behaviour. In the end he bears the impress of his public school or university so indelibly that it will be almost impossible for him to conceal his training even if he tries to do so. Group consciousness in its dynamic aspects suffuses the whole personality, and

asserts itself like some vital and abiding essence whose elemental nature eludes analysis. Sir Martin Conway has aptly quoted Mr Asquith's tribute to the late Percy Illingworth, "No ~~one~~ man had imbibed and assimilated with more zest and sympathy that strange, indefinable, almost impalpable atmosphere, compounded of tradition and modern influences, which preserves, as we all of us think, the unique but indestructible personality of the most ancient of the deliberative assemblies of the world".[1]

What are the main conditions favouring the growth of group consciousness? We need hardly say that these conditions by no means apply to both the savage and the civilised man, since they differ so greatly in beliefs, customs, and habits of life. With primitive races five principal factors may be enumerated: (1) A common territory sharply marked off from that of neighbouring tribes. Professor Baldwin Spencer[2]'s definition of tribe, as already quoted before, lays great stress on its territorial basis. Indeed, the ever-present necessity for common defence of the tribal boundaries against invasion or attacks is an important factor. Under primitive conditions of life a common territory more or less implies common blood. The individual members of a tribe, by the very fact of their occupying the same area, may

1.-The Crowd in Peace and War, p.49.
2-Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia, p.34. See above p. 17.

be held to bear some degree of kinship to each other. Even in the absence of real kinship, alien elements may become absorbed into the tribe; and in any case a belief in common descent, whether based on facts or not, suffices to foster group consciousness when that belief is joined with an idea of common territorial possessions. As these two factors, common territory and kinship, are really inseparable, they are here dealt with together.(2) The general, though by no means universal, recognition of collective responsibility. In some of the Pacific islands the whole group is held responsible for the guilt of any one member or members. "In many cases, the whole family were punished for the offence of one or more of its members, and in some cases a large number of men would be sent to enforce the decisions of the elders by taking away the property of the family, or in some cases by banishing them from the village".[1] What was true of the family was equally true of the tribe in the eyes of other tribes. This practice of communal revenge is itself already a powerful factor in the awakening of group consciousness, but it is in many cases further strengthened by superstitious beliefs. For example, the primitive races of North Borneo believe that certain spirits which they call "toh"[2] are "the powers that bring misfortune upon a whole house or village when any member of it

1. G. Brown, Melanesians and Polynesians, p.291.
2. Ch. Hose and McDougall, Pagan Tribes of North Borneo, 1912, Vol. II, p.26, and also p.194.

ignores tabus or otherwise breaks customs without performing the propitiatory rites demanded by the occasion". This belief compels every individual to take an personal interest in the behaviour of the other members of his tribe, while at the same time it develops a sense of individual responsibility to the community as a whole.(3) Wars and rivalry between neighbouring tribes. There is much truth in the Darwinian view that in the struggle of primitive groups, "the least indication of a military bond is then enough to turn the scale".[1] The efficient group survives as a fighting organism, the universal law being to get and to hold. In the absence of legal and moral restraints, savage tribes are known to have been constant victims of their own combative instinct. The slightest provocation is enough to fill their breasts with war passions. Under these conditions of stress and conflict the savage realises the need of co-operative defence or attack as well as his own place in the whole fighting force. His group consciousness is thus early developed through sheer necessity if nothing else.
(4) The general existence of totemic groups within the same clan. Each group claims affinity with some particular plant or animal, with which every individual member more or less identifies himself. For instance, in New Britain and Duke of York Island, all the people divide themselves into two exogamous groups, each having its own totem. Neither group will kill or injure its totem, and any

1. Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics.

harm done to the totem of one group by the other cannot but lead to a serious quarrel. The totem in each case becomes the visible symbol of a whole group and as such it intensifies its group consciousness.(5)The helplessness of the individual and his utter dependence on his tribe or clan. In primitive societies the individual alone is much more helpless than is commonly realised. He lives in constant dread of wild animals and hostile tribes, placing himself in imminent danger the moment he wanders away from his immediate family circle. In any case,he cannot fend for himself, and perishes when isolated from the group. His utter dependence on his community has given birth to the conception of"the tribal self"."The savage",says W.K.Clifford,[1]"is not only hurt when anybody treads on his foot,but when anybody treads on his tribe.....The actual pains or pleasures which come from the woe or weal of the tribe and which are the source of this conception drop out of consciousness and are remembered no more,the symbol which has replaced them becomes a centre and goal of immediate desires,powerful enough in many cases to override the strongest suggestions of individual pleasure or pain".

The group consciouness of the civilised man depends for its growth upon certain factors which either do not operate in the same degree in savage communities or hardly at all.These factors may be conveniently grouped under five heads,and are not necessarily all present

1.Lectures and Essays,edited by Leslie Stephen and Sir F. Pollock,Vol.II,p.79 et seq.

in the same group.(1)The smallness of a common area occupied by a people or nation, especially if this area is confined within sharply delimited boundaries such as the sea or high mountains, deserves first to be noted. In such a case, complete isolation from the rest of the world further intensifies the group spirit instead of weakening it. Take Iceland for illustration. "The lonely dweller ~~in~~ of the Atlantic", as the Icelanders call their own country, is a real and persistent reminder of their isolated state, and for that reason impels them to closer unity among themselves. An Icelandic writer declares that "it is largely due to the insular position of Iceland that the national consciousness of the people is early awakened". He further observes that "the very thought of the island as lying in the ocean isolated from the rest of the world has inspired many a patriotic poem and song".(2) Group self-knowledge acquired through free intercourse either with the group or with other

1. Einbúi Atlandshafsins.
2. Professor Guðm. Finbogason, Land og þjóð, Reykjavik, 1921 (Árbók Háskóla Íslands), p. 3
   "Og varla er efi á því, að hin skýra takmörkun landsins hefir átt sinn þátt í því, hve snemma þjóðarmeðvitundin vakuði á Íslandi".
3. op.cit.p.8 --"Hugsunin um eyjuna, sem liggur úti i reginhafi fjarri öðrum löndum, hefir oft bergmálað í islenskum ættjarðarljóðum".
   (áttvís á tvennar álfustrendur,
   einbýl, jafnvig á báðar hendur,
   situr hún hafsins höfuðmið.)

groups. The group-regarding sentiments are powerfully reinforced by comparison and contrast with other groups and by the idea of one's own group as seen in a reflected light. The lack of modern means of communication in China had until recently ~~imposed~~ been an insuperable barrier to the growth of national consciousness among her people The vastness of the country further conspired to bring about the same result. This shows that isolation acts as a aid to group consciousness only in the case of a small country, preferably an island. (3) Homogeneity of race and mind and character. A common disposition derived from a common environment is a necessary preliminary to collective interests and ideals in group co-operation. Physical and mental homogeneity profoundly influences the internal cohesion and unity of every group. It is for this reason that the lowest crowd is said to be one composed of individuals belonging to widely different races.[1] At the other extreme we have a homogeneous community possessing certain common contents of consciousness. Group self-knowledge is further increased by whatever clearly marks off one group from all other groups, such as flags, badges, rites, and ceremonies peculiar to the group. (4) Long life and tradition. Tradition may be said to consist of a mass of operative ideas and sentiments whose origin often goes back to dim antiquity; and so defined, it naturally requires time as an essential

1. Le Bon, The Crowd, p. 177.

condition of its growth. Its influence in fostering the group spirit cannot be overestimated; suffice it to say that a new school or university often fails to inspire in its members that esprit de corps so characteristic of older foundations. The instruction given in such an institution may well be more up-to-date and thorough-going, but the lack of tradition is nevertheless a serious drawback to the higher development of personality. Given a sound tradition and wise guidance, the work of education is at least half accomplished. Group consciousness, as it were, is anchored to tradition; and in the absence of the latter it tends to drift aimlessly and achieve little or nothing of value. The mental homogeneity to which we have referred really depends on the influence of a common tradition more than anything else. (5) The heightened feeling of mutual dependence in co-operative activities of all kinds. This is especially manifest when one observes a modern nation at war with another. Every citizen has a vague fear and hate of the common foe, and welcomes with instinctive affection his fellow-countrymen as sharers of their common weal or woe as the fortunes of war may determine. Under such circumstances, the idea of the group as a whole is vividly present in every mind, and purely egoistic motives are voluntarily sacrificed on the altar of patriotism. (6) Collective secrecy. When there is some common secrecy to be kept within the group, a feeling of communal responsibility is naturally aroused to an unusually high pitch

since it lies within the power of any one member to "give away" the whole group. The concequences would be especially dreadful where the betrayal of a group would inevitably mean its persecution or dissolution by force, such as the numerous secret political societies that existed during the period of the French Revolution in many parts of France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. A whole movement often collapses as the result of the treachery of one individual as may be evidenced by the ultimate fate of the Philadelphic Society of Besaucon when it became merged into the Olympians. Collective secrecy was an imperative necessity under autocratic rule where freedom of association of speech was entirely forbidden. But even where this circumstance no longer applies, as for example the Free Masons of today, the possession of some common secret not shared by outsiders is always a powerful stimulus to the growth of group consciousness. Moreover, we have to note that collective secrecy in itself and quite apart from all questions of utility seems to yield peculiar satisfaction to the individual members of the group.

In conclusion, the growth of group consciousness may be favoured by a number of conditions which are of course not all present in every case. The more important of these are the smallness of a country coupled with its isolation from the rest of the world, racial and mental homogeneity, group self-knowledge derived from free intercourse both within and without the group, long

continuity of existence and the growth of tradition, the adoption of badges and emblems and whatever distinguishes a group from other groups, and last but not least, the possesion of some collective secret which must not be divulged.

VI.

## ABBERATIONS OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS.

We have in the preceding section indicated the value of group consciousness in the socialisation of egoistic motives, and the important rôle played by tradition in the moulding of character within the system of a group-regarding sentiment. But before we proceed to discuss the educational significance of our findings, it must be carefully noted that group consciousness as we have defined it, is a double-edged weapon. On the one hand, it can achieve the greatest good in human society as undoubtedly it has done; but on the other hand it can just as easily be a source of untold harm both to society and its individual members. When abused, the group spirit is a far more potent agency for evil than the anti-social conduct of an individual as an individual can ever be. The greatest problem of to-day in politics, industry, and international relations alike is fundamentally the problem of harmonising the conflicting group consciousnesses of nations and classes or minor groups within the nation. The advent of democracy with the extension of franchise has rendered the solution of this problem all the more urgent, since voting has become the orthodox means of ascertaining popular wishes and desires. The author of "The Group Mind" has striven to emphasise the merits of the group spirit without doing full justice to the ways in which it may be abused. Throughout his book, McDougall has shown a strong ethical trend. But if we are to give a complete psychological account of the subject, it will

be necessary to deal with the aberrations of group consciousness.

Group consciousness in itself cannot, of course, yield us any ethical criterion, since it is impossible to estimate whether or not the self-devotion of any group is detrimental to the larger interests of society until the rightful claims of all other groups have been considered in relation to it. Take any group within the larger social whole. Supposing that all its members have become strongly imbued with a group spirit, it is an excellent thing for the group itelf, but it by no means follows that such a development will have an equally beneficial effect upon the complex of groups contained within society as a whole. Thus Professor L.T. Hobhouse writes, "Every group of human beings acquires a corporate life and with it only too probably a collective selfishness which over long periods may hold the development of other groups in arrest". When therefore we speak of the aberrations of group consiousness, we do so more from an ethical, than from a strictly psychological, point of view. But if we sift our data in this way, their presentation none the less involves a positive statement of a definite class of facts.

Broadly speaking, the aberrations of group consciousness fall into two divisions, viz. (1) those that involve active hostility or warfare against other groups, and (2) those that involve more or less peaceful withdrawal from the larger life of society. There can be of course no hard and fast line between the two classes of phenomena,

1. Metaphysical Theory of the State, p.49

since one may pass into the other as a natural phase of development. The first class of facts may be exemplified by two of the most potent sources of violent conflict and unrest in the modern world: (a) national jingoism in the sphere of international relations, (b) class war in the sphere of industry. The second class of facts may be illustrated by five distinct types of phenomena: (a) social stratification; (b) racial prejudice; (c) reactionism; (d) group self-absorption; (e) group nepotism. It goes without saying that pugnacious aberrations are far more dangerous to world peace and national welfare than those of a pacific tendency, but it may be at once granted that all of them are alike devastating in their effects, differing not so much in kind as in degree. It yet remains the crowning task of psychology to discover, and that of education to apply, the means of combating these collective evils from which the world is suffering so much to-day.

National jingoism may be regarded as an extreme development of nationalism, which in itself is or may be a noble source of inspiration. But it is sometimes mistaken for patriotism or love of country, and thus actively promotes the collective selfishness of a whole nation in such a way that it cannot but lead to international rivalry and hostility. Germany before the Great War may be taken as a good example of this. German nationalism dates back to the period of the Napoleonic wars when it originated as a protest against foreign aggression. It

paved the way to the union of the Germanic states under the lead of Prussia, and it at first served its purpose as a necessary doctrine for their national self-preservation. But in less than fifty years it soon degenerated in the name of 'Kultur' into national jingoism. According to Meyer,[1] 'Kultur' is the all-inclusive term to denote "the aggregate of bodily and mental characteristics, ideas, customs, and social institutions which belong to a particular people or nation and which are handed down from generation to generation". Thus defined, 'Kultur becomes the peculiar possession of a given nation, as distinguished from civilisation which is world-wide or at least common to a group of nations. In the course of development German 'Kultur' came to be exalted above everything else, deluding the German people into the belief that they, being its highest representatives, were charged with the divine mission of propagating it by any and every means to all other nations. This process of national self-aggrandisement was reinforced by the teaching of Hegel. Regarding the State as the highest embodiment of 'Sittlichkeit' or social morality, he taught that the State was subject to no moral or legal restraints such as individuals are. This belief in the omnipotence of the State and the superiority of their own 'Kultur' to all others had inspired the Germans with a passion, and a feeling of moral justification, for world conquest, which culminated in the outbreak of the war in 1914. Psychologically, we may say that the positive self-feeling in their case

1. Die Geschichte des Altertums, Einleitung, 4

has been inordinately developed without the counter-balancing effect of the negative self-feeling.National jingoism never fails to make a nation blind to the needs and aspirations of all other nations;it dictates a militaristic policy which can only lead to wars and recurrence of wars.National consciousness of this extreme type means the unreasoning pride of a whole nation ,a feeling of contempt for all other nations, and an unscrupulous desire to glorify itself at the expense of the latter.It may be ascribed to the pooling of individual self-esteem into national proportions.A recent writer[1] declares,"The habit of believing all good of our own nation and all evil of another is a kind of national egotism,having all the symptons and absurdities of personal egotism or self-esteem;yet it does not seem to us to be egotism,because the object of our esteem seems to be,not ourselves,but the nation.Most of us have no conviction of sin about it,such as we have about our own egotism;nor does boasting of our country seem to us vulgar,like boasting of ourselves. Yet we do boast about it because it is our country,and we feel a warm conviction of its virtues which we do not feel about the virtues of any other country."

Class war in its organised as well as most acute form is perhaps best represented by Trade Unionism.It is usually confined within a nation,though it tends to transcend national boundaries.Although due primarily to economic causes,the bitterness of the struggle shows

1.Clutton Brock in The Atlantic Monthly, Dec.,1921,p.724

an unfortunate tendency to spread to all other relations between the labouring class and the employing class. Labour unrest has frequently resulted in the serious dislocation of industry and commerce ; and the life of every Western community is literally in the hands of a small group of trade unions. The members of these unions and their employers become solidified into separate groups, each over-conscious of its own claims , each seeking to convict the other in every industrial dispute. The employer looks upon the trade unions "as hostile associations bent on getting for their members as high wages for as little work as possible, and robbing him of what he considers the just fruits of his enterprise".[1] The employee, on the other hand, declares, "I do not want merely to swell the wealth of the capitalist. As a worker, I demand a share in the control of industry, just as I have a vote in the government of my country."[1] Such an antagonistic attitude on both sides has rendered industrial unrest not only inevitable but of constant occurrence; and the root cause of it is always an aberration of group consciousness. A similar, though by no means equally serious, case is the struggle of women against the masculine monopoly of certain professions. Most men seem to resent the entry of women into what they regard as their special spheres of activity. This tendency may develop into the class consciousness of the sexes, not unlike the relations between labour and capital.

Of the peaceful withdrawal of a group from the larger life of society, the most stiking example is the

1. C.S. Myers, Mind and Work, p. 170

social stratification that one finds in all modern industrial democracies. True democracy means the perfection of the social ladder, whereby every individual may without difficulty find the position to which his natural ability entitles him. Increased educational facilities extend to all classes the indispensable means to this end. But in actual practice different classes within the community show a strong tendency towards stratification, which, while externally rendering the social ladder all the more visible, in reality spells its breakdown and the negation of democracy. Apart from economic causes, this is largely due to an aberrant growth of the group spirit of each class. The inequalities of wealth are nothing in comparison with the even more striking inequalities in intelligence, breadth of outlook, and liberality of mind. England, for example, has become a land of great contrasts: her upper classes have attained a degree of refinement and intelligence seldom equalled by those in a corresponding social position in other countries, "while the lower strata," in the words of McDougall,[1] "contain a deplorable proportion of human beings of poor quality". Such obviously undesirable results could have been largely, if not entirely, avoided if free intercourse between the different classes had been maintained and if the pernicious idea of social status had not rendered it more or less impracticable.

Racial prejudice is probably instinctive, though that is by no means clearly established, especially as children of widely different races have been observed to

1. National Welfare and National Decay, p. 155

mix freely without any feeling of mutual aversion, and as even among adults it is usually possible to overcome it on further acquaintance. Racial animosity becomes particularly pernicious when it affects the social and political relations between the white and the non-white races. Each race arrogantly believes itself to be superior to all others, exalts its own virtues and sees or pretends to see in the alien races nothing but vice. This tendency has developed itself to an extreme in the United States,[1] where racial segregation has been the most striking feature in the relations between the whites and blacks in the southern states. While separate religious worship is entirely voluntary, it is required by the statutes of all southern states to segregate the two races in all schools maintained by public taxation. No negro is allowed to enter a white school and vice versa. This process of compulsory segregation has been extended even to the means of public conveyance. On the railways, different coaches have to be provided for white and black passengers. Besides, each race shows a general unwillingness to congregate under the same roof as the other. It is in fact enforced by the law to maintain a rigid line of demarcation between the white residential quarter and the black. In the southern states racial segregation has been carried so far that practically the only point of contact between the two races is that of master and servant. Pride of race is a valuable asset if confined within due limits but in its extreme form it cannot fail to be disastrous

1. P.A. Bruce in Hibbert Journal, Vol. XIII, p. 867

to all concerned. It remains an urgent task for the psychologist to discover the real basis of racial prejudice, whether or not it is an instinct, and if so, how far and under what conditions it may be overcome.

Reactionism is the enemy of social progress, as it inspires its adherents with an obstinate desire to cling to outworn creeds and to justify the existing order of things merely because ~~they~~ it exists. It means in every case the enslavement of the human intellect by antiquated ideas and beliefs under the pressure of social suggestion. A passage from Francis Galton well illustrates this process: "The vast majority of our race have a natural tendency to shrink from the responsibility of standing and acting alone; they exalt the vox populi, even when they know it to be the utterance of a mob of nobodies, into the vox dei and they are willing slaves to tradition, authority, and custom." Galton attributes this phenomenon to man's gregarious nature, but at all events it operates through an obstinate disinclination to break away from tradition. As every community has its distinct stock of traditions, in the last analysis it can be interpreted as an aberration of group consciousness. Reactionism may operate in another form, namely, in the sacrificing of individuality to mob opinion. Under its influence the individual becomes unreasonably afraid of his own views in deference to the popular passions of the moment. There is indeed a kind of fatalism of the multitude which overpowers the free intellect of all except the most resolute and daring.

1. Enquiries into Human Faculty, 1887, p. 69

In a large modern democracy where votes are counted by the million, the individual droops down to insignificance and impotent apathy. This is especially true of the United States.[3] In a less degree it may and does occur in all minor groups. Take for instance a public school. A boy usually shares a group of irrational prejudices with his fellow-students, but he is prevented from discarding them partly by habit and largely by a feeling of his own impotency against the current opinion of the whole school. In such a case group consciousness completely dominates over the individual mind.

By group self-absorption is meant the complete self-devotion of a group to its own interests to the exclusion of all other interests of the community as a whole. Chinese familism furnishes a good example of what we mean. For centuries in China the individual had been regarded more as a member of his family ~~rather~~ than as a citizen of his country. His highest duty consisted of maintaining the male line of descent[1] so as to preserve the unbroken continuity of the family tradition. The teaching of Confucius demands the complete identification of the son with his parents. The Hsiao--King or Filial Classic[2] exhorts, "Do not injure or put to improper uses your body with all its hair and skin; and remember that it is what you have received from your parents". The Chinese youth is also

1. Mencius said, "There are three forms of unfilial conduct, but the greatest of these is to die without (male) issue." 不孝有三，無後為大.

2. 身體髮膚，受之父母，不敢毀傷.(孝經)

3. cf. Lord Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol. II, Chap. LXXXIV.

taught "to love always what his parents love, and hate always what his parents hate."[1] This Confucian tradition is reinforced by the universal practice of ancestor worship,[2] which literally confers on familism the dignity of a religion. While it has contributed immeasurably to the social stability of our country, familism is largely responsible for the early stagnation of the Chinese civilisation, and the long retarded awakening of her national consciousness. It may be asserted that for centuries China had been a family-state rather than a nation-state. While the group spirit of the family had always profoundly moulded the life and character of our youths, patriotism in the full sense of the word had up to the middle of the nineteenth century hardly emerged even in the minds of the literati. What commonly passed for patrictism was little more than dynastic loyalty. Until within recent years, family fortunes formed the one absorbing interest of every man, to the exclusion of the larger interests of the nation as a whole. A popular metaphor that has survived in the Chinese language possesses striking significance in this regard : whenever we wish to express complete indifference or apathy to any project, our attitude is quaintly described as "the natives of Ch'in[3] watching the

1. cf. Hsiao Shoh Yün Nüh 小學韻語 (羅澤南編)
2. Except of course those already converted to Christianity, but they are still a minority.
3. Ch'in is an archaic name for Shensi, in North-West China.

如秦人視越人之肥瘠

inhabitants of Yüeh[1] growing fat or lean."In the early days of Western intercourse,foreigners in China were regarded merely as so many individuals without the least idea of the nationalities they represented.It would cause small surprise that to a people with whom family consciousness had usurped the place of national consciousness,no gain or loss to the country as a whole was of any consequence until their own family interests had thereby become visibly involved.We may say that the greatest transformation that China has undergone within recent years is the awakening of her national consciousness,which has been rendered possible by an extension of the family consciousness of her people.Group self-absorption,as we have seen, is tantamount to collective selfishness,and as such it admits of every degree of universality.The unit may be the family,the clan or the nation,but in every case it is characterised by indifference and apathy towards all larger interests outside the strict limits of the group.

Group nepotism or favouritism is inextricably bound up with the desire to increase or maintain the prestige of a group.Whenever an appointment is given to a person,not primarily because of his fitness for it, but because of his belonging to one's own group,it sooner or later leads to corruption in public affairs.Similarly,if one deliberately connives at the faults of another merely because of the fact that he belongs to the same group and that his exposure will sully the

1.Yüeh roughly corresponds to modern Chekiang, South East China.

good name of the group, the innate justice of moral judgment is perverted. By exalting, or shielding from censure, a fellow-member for no other reason than that he is a fellow-member, whether of the same school, the same nationality or the same race, a partisan spirit is developed. It renders its victim blind to the faults of his group or of any of its members in his over-anxiety to maintain its prestige in the eyes of the world.

It may be at once granted that, having regard to the enormous size of a modern nation-state and still more of that of the world with its teeming millions, no group can attain perfect homogeneity within itself except under the constant pressure of rivalry and competition with other, especially similarly constituted, groups. But this necessity must not be allowed to obscure the gravity of the dangers of segregation in any shape or form, which lie in the substitution of a minor group for the larger and more inclusive group outside it. Social seggregation of any kind results in nothing less than the stunted growth of personality. An American writer has well said, "He who cuts himself off from any part of humanity does so at his own moral risk..... Human nature never atrophies quite so hopelessly as when a group from its own selfish interest cuts itself from the whole." We must remember that the wonderful diversity and richness of life is only sustained by the freest possible intercourse between man and man; the more they differ, the greater the contribution that each has to make to the other. Life is not of one rigid pattern, but of many patterns.

1. E.H. Griggs, Moral Education, New York, p. 117

## VII.

## EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS.

Since we have defined group consciousness as the identification of the self with thw group and the sentiment of loyalty thus inspired to its tradition and welfare, the central problem in education is a three-fold one: (1) The training of the right attitude to tradition, (2) How to intensify the idea of the group as embodying the tradition, (3) How to establish harmonious relations between different group consciousnesses in the same mind. These and other kindred topics of educational importance will mainly occupy our attention in the present section.

Every child is born into a particular social environment representing the slow growth of centuries. He could have had no share in its creation; and throughout his long youth his first task is to adapt himself, consciously and unconsciously, to the established intellectual and moral traditions as he finds them. Long before attaining manhood his character and intelligence have been so moulded as to conform throughout later life more or less to the commonly accepted standards. The combined influence of the family and the school has early fixed the directions in which he is to work out his destiny as a unique individual. In short he owes everything to his social environment, from the command of articulate speech to his entire intellectual outlook. It is therefore of the utmost importance to determine what constitutes the right attitude to tradition, especially, from an educational point of view, to that part of it

which the school directly seeks to transmit from generation to generation.

Tradition, properly understood, is by no means inimical to social progress; rather it is to be looked upon as so much consolidated ground for further advance. While in every age of discovery and innovation the popular outcry is to free men from the shackles of tradition, it is nevertheless tradition that perpetuates the life of society itself, or we should always have to begin everything anew and nothing could be learnt from past ages. All the higher types of group consciousness operate through the agency of tradition; and in its absence, the consciousness of the idea of the group, however vivid, must remain poor in content and impotent in action. The school, or the family, or any other permanent group exerts a powerful influence on the moral conduct of an individual only in so far as he is genuinely inspired by the noble deeds of the past, the examples of great men, and the ideals exemplified in their lives--with which the group as a group is identified. Its disciplinary value is very great for the reason that it touches the inner springs of conduct, and in that respect radically differs from such extraneous motives as the fear of punishment and the expectation of reward. A man may be tempted to err in a moment of weakness, but the thought of himself as a member of his family or school and of its good name not to be disgraced through him, effectively reinforces his active powers of self-control as nothing else can. This explains the notoriously low moral standard of the outcaste, the

vagabond, and the tramp who identifies himself with no nation or community in particular. What is true of civilised men is perhaps even more true of the less developed races. For example, the tribal system of the South African natives has been found to be indispensable to their moral welfare, and nothing but evil would result if it were broken down by the concentration of native labour in large centres of industry. "Its greatest recommendation", reported the South African Native Races Committee,[1] "is that it preserves the tribal and family life of the natives, and to some extent avoids the evils which invariably arise when uneducated tribal natives are allowed to live in the towns. Tribal discipline and tribal sentiments supply the only moral restraints as yet have any effective on this class of natives....."

But important as tradition is in our moral life, it is equally important to bear in mind that moral concepts, like the concepts of science, are not eternal and unchangeable. W.K. Clifford[2] has defined morality as 'the conditions of gregariousness'. As 'gregariousness' itself has obviously assumed different forms at different stages of human development, the 'conditions' which render it possible must correspondingly vary from age to age. Moral progress can only mean moral change in the right direction. In regard to the rules of moral conduct, Aristotle has truly said that "the agents themselves must in every case consider what the occasion demands, just as in the case of

1. cf. The South African Natives, pub. by John Murray, Lond., 1909. Also see Report by Mr S.O. Samuelson, Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, Jan., 21, 1908.
2. cf. Lectures and Essays, edited by Leslie Stephen and Sir Frederick Pollock.

navigation and medicine."Moral tradition acts as a guide only in so far as it leads to right doing;blind obedience to its dictates under all circumstances does more harm than good.The Chinese sage Meo-tze said,"It is nevertheless filial conduct to seize hold of your father by his hair if by so doing you will save him from drowning."The school should encourage as much as possible ~~the~~ the growth of moral initiative,i.e.,intelligent adaptation to the special needs and requirements of a given situation.In any case,all actions resulting from blind adherence to moral rules are,strictly speaking,devoid of moral value.

In intellectual life,the value of tradition is equally great,though probably not so obvious.Regarded as a standard of attainment,the school tradition,for example, acts as a powerful stimulus to the youthful ambitions of the child and inspires him with a strong desire to maintain the high standard for which his school is known. But here again,a great danger has to be guarded against. Tradition may come to be regarded as the sole goal of intellectual achievement,beyond,~~and outside of~~,which nothing is considered worth attempting.The darkness of the Middle Ages may be traced to this very cause,for it can only result in intellectual stagnation and atrophy of the creative powers of man.

Education should aim at,as it were,a democratic organisation of the mind.All ideas,whether traditional or not,must deserve equal respect;and the sole criterion

1.Aristotle on Education,Eng.trans.by Burnet,p.47

2.Abridged from:昔齊人乘船渡江,其父墮水,其子攘臂捽頭顛倒,使水從口出,而父命得甦.夫捽頭顛倒,不孝莫大.然以全父之身,若拱手修孝子之常,父命絕於水矣.(見呂子)

of thier adoption or rejection should be their fitness as a mirror of truth. If this principle were early inculcated in the young mind, devotion to the tradition of one's group, whether school or family or nation, one of the chief conditions on which the successful development of freely-working individuality depends. The tradition of a group with which a man identifies himself must not blind him to its faults and less desirable features, nor must it in any way set a limit to his own possible goal of endeavour. "Yes!" exclaimed Karl Pearson[1] with great emphasis, "sympathy with the Past we must have, but war, ceaseless war, with that Past which seeks with its idols to crush the growth of the Present! The right to re-shape itself is the chief birth-right of humanity...." No one serves his group better than when he is ever on the alert to re-interpret its tradition as occasion demands.

The main conditions of fostering a group spirit have already been dealt with, but certain factors of educational importance deserve to be noted. Music is a great unifying force, and in schools where collective singing is not encouraged there is a distinct lack of a corporate spirit. The system of colleges, forms, and 'houses' is most effective in appealing to the child's pride in his particular unit and to his desire for maintaining its honour and glory in the eyes of the competing units. There is definite evidence to show that mental development takes place through participation in group games, such as football, hockey, cricket, and net-ball.[2] Among the poorer classes

1. Ethics of Free-thought, p. 304
2. Brit. Journal of Psychology Monograph No. 4, 'The Psychology of the Organised Group Game', by M. J. Reaney, p. 51

in large towns the play-ground movement has proved itself a great moral force. Where group games have been introduced, one finds "a marked increase in school discipline and efficiency, and a decrease of truancy and of juvenile delinquency which can be clearly traced to the introduction of organised play and games amongst the children of the poorer classes".[1]

In school punishment the only effective measure is the one that appeals to the child's fear of being alienated from his group. Just as group consciousness yields peculiar satisfaction in a glowing feeling of corporate power and security, so enforced isolation from the group to which one is most attached strikes a peculiar terror which is, with all normal children, so dreadful that it is quite unbearable. Hence in punishing a child it will be unwise for the teacher to do so without at the same time showing the class the justness of his action, or the young culprit may very likely come to be exalted by his class-mates as a martyr to the teacher's supposed cruelty or capriciousness. The grave danger here is that it tends to defeat its own purpose: it would not only fail to deter a child from future offences, but positively encourage indiscipline as a means of achieving popularity. The opinions of one's most intimate group, i.e., the group of equals whose company one normally seeks, and with whom one feels perfectly 'at home', is a most powerful factor in determining behaviour. On the profound influence of the fellow-members of one's group, Locke[2] wrote that "no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike who

1. Op.cit., p.65

2. Essay, Bk., II, Chap. XXVIII, Sec. 12.

offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one in ten thousand who is still and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society." The phenomenal success of the Boy Scout movement may be traced directly to the fostering of a group spirit. Sir R. Baden-Powell[1] writes, "The discipline of the movement.... comes from the inward desire to 'play the game' for his patrol, troop, district, or country." Group discipline is in the last analysis self-discipline, since it is only the group or groups with which the child identifies himself can influence his behaviour through his love of corporate life on the one hand and dread of isolation on the other.

We have seen in the last section the ways in which aberrations of group consciousness commonly occur; and to remedy these is unquestionably the most urgent task —and at the same time the most worthy task—to which education should address itself if by education we mean, as we can hardly do otherwise, the process of socialising the child's natural powers and capacities, or in other words, the development of his individuality in and through the social medium. Before the world can be made into a happy arena of free co-operation between human groups of every degree of universality as is demanded by a widening intellectual horizon and an increasing range of material interests, mankind must first unite to remove its greatest

1. Social Aspects of Education, 1921, Sec. XVII.

obstacle in the form of an aberrant group spirit;and this can only be achieved by means of education.

Animal gregariousness,as we have seen,may assume any of the three main forms:the bee-hive,the herd,or the hunting pack.On the human level the first type as involving structural differences of gradation of different classes of individuals obviously does not exist,and so the herd and the pack alone have to be reckoned with.While possessing certain features in common,the one is psychologically distinct from the other.From an educational point of view it is important to determine which of these two types of group consciousness,if we take them as illustrative types,is to be encouraged;and we have excellent reasons for maintaining that the hunting pack consciousness is immeasurably superior to the herd consciousness.In the first place,the former is characterised by its interest in the common quest.While the group acts as one unit,each individual member of it retains that power of initiative as may be demanded by any unexpected development in the situation.The herd,on the other hand,provides no such scope for active participation in group life,and is not sustained by a common interest in the chase.Secondly,the pack derives its motive power from an internal 'drive' or urge which is truly hormic in the highest sense of the word,[1] while the herd is driven to collective action by external pressure such as by the necessity for self-defence against a common enemy.Thirdly,it follows that the hunting pack is charcterised by group self-activity which can not be attributed to the herd,and that concequently the former exhibits a group spirit of far greater vividness,

1.For a definition of 'horme',see Professor Nunn's Education:Its Data and Priciples,p.21

concreteness, and intensity than is possible with the latter. The educational corollary of this truth is that the school should stand for a definite set of ideals to be inculcated in the child, so that he may actively co-operate with his teacher and fellow-pupils in its effective realisation. Unless every member of the school is made aware of certain common ideals to be realised, no group spirit of educational value can be fostered. The aggressive attitude of the hunting pack to its prey should be transferred to the pursuit of an ideal or ideals by group co-operation.

The one ideal of all ideals to be made the object of a common quest both at school and out of it should be a hierarchy of group consciousnesses, each more inclusive than the other until humanity as a whole comes to be embraced within its purview. Such a hierarchy is the only effective remedy for all the worst evils with which the world is afflicted to-day.

For group co-operation ~~co-operation~~ to be effective, probably the number of individuals must always be restricted within the normal range of sight and hearing. Even as strangers, human beings of allied races have as a rule a mild instinctive liking for one another, but unless they have an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted, this potential good-will accomplishes little or nothing. Most men can hardly see anything beyond their immediate circle of friends and relations. A modern nation with its teeming millions is already unwieldily large as a unit of effective group co-operation; humanity as a whole sounds an impossible conglomeration, at once too vague and too heterogeneous to call forth altruistic

feelings of any intensity. It seems to be an innate disposition that whatever is near and immediate in human relations evokes a response totally out of proportion to its intrinsic importance, with the natural result that little attention and interest is aroused by anything remote either in time or space. All apparent exceptions to the rule may, directly or indirectly, be traced either to rational calculations or to the operation of the instinct of curiosity which in itself means nothing more than purely intellectual satisfaction. It is probably due to this instinctive limitation of man's capacity for co-operation that Aristotle[1] recommended that the size of a State should be no larger than is possible for all its citizens to see and hear one another. But we have travelled far from the Greek city-states, and the increasing necessity for effective world-wide co-operation in the interest of peace and progress dictates to education its most urgent problem.

The solution of this problem brings us back to the ideal of a hierarchy of group consciousnesses. This ideal is no visionary and impracticable hope. On the contrary, it can be progressively realised by a natural extension of the group-regarding sentiment from comparatively small units to include larger and larger groups until it embraces the universal group. About the 5th century before Christ the sages of China had based their ethical system on the same principle. Mencius[2] wrote, "I respect my elders so that I may extend that respect to other people's elders; I first treat my own

1. Politics, Bk. VII, Chap. IV.
2. 老吾老，以及人之老；幼吾幼，以及人之幼.... 古之人所以大過人者，無他焉，善推其所為而已.（孟子）

offspring with affection so that I may treat other people's offspring with a like affection....The ancients greatly surpassed us for no other reason than that they were thus able to extend their range of activity."Motih or Motze,who repeatedly declared his love for the whole world,exhorted,"Look upon other people's country as if it were your own;look upon other people's family as if it were your own;look upon another person as if he were yourself."The 'Great Learning'of Confucius opens with his idea of moral development,"First perfect your own moral nature,then set your family in order,next serve your country,next bring peace to the entire world".The latest teaching of psycho-analysis tends to show that the extension of sentiments attached to a small group is not only possible,but actually inevitable.According to Freud,the earliest manifestation of a child's sentiment towards his parents largely determines,through the mechanism of displacement,his loves and hates of later life.It is said that "an individual's outlook and point of view in dealing with many of the most important questions of human existence can be expressed in terms of the position he has taken up with regard to the problems and difficulties arising out of the relatively narrow world of the family."But then one is naturally tempted

1. 視人之國，若視其國，視人之家，若視其家，視人之身，若視其身，(墨子)
2. 修身，治家，齊國，平天下.
3. cf. Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.
4. J.C.Flügel, The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family, 1921, p.4

to ask why the hierarchy of group consciousness, which is no more than the gradual transference of a sentiment from small groups to larger and larger units, is far from being a universal feature of man's social relations. The charge must, especially in the case of those whose early family relations had been perfectly happy and yet fail to regard wider and more inclusive groups with a like affection, be laid at the door of education.

Every independent State of to-day pursues, with few exceptions, an educational policy calculated to promote its own security and success in competition with other States. It seeks to teach patriotism of the chauvinistic type, so that at best the group consciousness of its citizens is confined to the nation-state, and in many cases even such a result has scarcely been achieved, as may be evidenced by the endless dissensions between certain minor groups within the State. No perfect hierarchy of group consciousnesses can be formed unless this nationalist ideal is so widened as to include all other nations through the progressive extension of the group-regarding sentiment. The greatest obstacle to such an extension is, as far as the school is concerned, the teach- of history as it is deliberately done to-day. As a record of facts, history should be strictly impartial and accurate, but as it is taught in the schools, every country may be said to adhere to its own version of the self-same facts. In a sense it has become like a party newspaper which takes care to offer just the kind of information best calculated to stimulate certain passions and to create a certain set of opinions. Thus every child

is taught at school to love his own country because it has produced most, if not all, of the world's greatest men. His country is made to appear generally victorious in war and just in its dealings with other nations, so that in the event of some future wars, he will feel all the braver and morally inspired to fight for her glory. This is the root cause of national jingoism which has already caused so much misery and blood-shed and will no doubt do so again as long as it is consciously inculcated in the minds of the rising generation in every country. The permanent peace of the world can only be maintained by a radical revision of history as it is taught. A strictly impartial account of the actual facts, in so far as they are ascertainable, must be substituted for the present exaggerations and inaccuracies and omissions made in the cause of nationalism. Such a work of revision may be profitably undertaken by a commission of experts to be appointed by the League of Nations. True patriotism is a noble ideal based on an intelligent appreciation of one's own country as well as other countries; it implies what Professor Royce[1] calls "a loyalty to loyalty" so that in loving our own country, we will also love other people's love of their country. The same truth is embodied in the principle of true internationalism so lucidly stated by L.T. Hobhouse,[2]

From time immemorial universal peace has been the constant theme of moralists, social reformers, and philosophers. Confucius[3] long ago spoke of universal brotherhood; Kant preached cosmopolitanism; and more recently

1. Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 118
2. cf. Democracy and Reaction, p. 190 et seq.
3. 大同主義

men like Norman Angell and Bertrand Russell have offered different schemes for securing a lasting peace. None of these has fulfilled its promise for the simple reason that in one way or another they all lack the necessary psychological foundation. Cosmopolitanism is too broad an ideal for the average mind, unless it represents in any particular case the highest point in the hierarchy of group consciousness[1]. No one can imagine and love the whole world without first loving those groups with which he is in more immediate contact. Moreover, every nation represents a real entity, a community of ideals, sentiments, and traditions, which cannot be simply merged into a world-state in order to lose completely its identity therein. The nation is, as Mazzini[1] pointed out, "the intermediate term between humanity and the individual". Nor will the creation of an international credit system as advocated by Mr Norman Angell[2] prevent nations from going to war. The economic interdependence of States dates back at least to the rise of modern industry and commerce, and yet there had been many wars during the last century. Nor will there be perpetual peace if capitalism were abolished, as Bertrand Russell[3] believes. A socialistic State may be equally liable to have imperialistic ambitions, as Bolshevism in Russia to-day undoubtedly shows such a tendency. We are inclined to believe that for the prevention of wars, such a project as the League of Nations, if honestly carried out by the co-operation of all States, great and small, is by far the most hopeful. But the covenant of the League will remain a superfluous

1. Life and Writings, Vol. V, p. 273
2. cf The Great Illusion
3. Roads to Freedom, pp. 151-153

document until every nation has definitely changed its educational policy of teaching patriotism of a narrow kind to an extended hierarchy of group consciousnesses in which national consciousness is to form no more than an intermediate link, though it is, as we have seen, a very necessary one.

In addition to the impartial teaching of history it will be necessary not only to encourage the freest possible inter-communication between all the nations of the earth, but to train the child during the period of his school education to realise with imaginative vividness the existence of peoples and races other than his own, so that his active sympathy may be at once quickened and widened. With the vast majority of men, the faces and voices within their normal range of sight and hearing are intensely real, while all others beyond this immediate circle tend to be dismissed as strangely unreal. With all the increased facilities for communication, the telegraph and the post, even members of parliament are sometimes tempted to regard it as a kind of glorified make-belief when they are called upon to legislate for millions of men and women whom they have never seen and probably will never see. If this applies to one's own nation, it is hardly to be wondered at that a distant country means no more than a patch of colour on the map, and that therefore cruel exploitation of other nations are so often contemplated in an impersonal light and systematically carried out without a sympathetic pain. But this need not continue to be so, if only the schools of every country aim at investing the existence of distant and alien peoples

with a deep sense of reality in that they are ,in spite of external differences,equally endowed with the same instincts and impulses,and equally capable of experiencing the emotions of love,anger,joy,sorrow,hope,and fear. To achieve such a result,it will be necessary to reorganise the teaching of geography. As the subject is being taught at schools to-day,undue prominence is given to one's own country,while the rest of the world is compressed into a few pages.In some cases a large foreign country is dismissed in one or two picturesque phrases. Some kind of balance between these different modes of treatment must be preserved if the youthful outlook is not to be so cramped as to extend no further than the home country.

Much has been written upon self-activity in education.Along different lines of enquiry,Fichte,Froebel, Herbart and many others have all extolled its educative value.But individual self-activity,while representing a necessary stage of development,ought by no means to be the sole concern of education.To serve as a training-ground for the growth of group consciousness,the school should provide special opportunities for group self-activity.The forms and conditions of group self-activity in which children are trained at school are invariably those which they carry into the larger world.If they have been herded by authority into heterogeneous classes and the conditions of harmonious co-operation are absent, they will inevitably acquire the habit of looking to authority at every step and thus lose the power of

individual. Except perhaps on the play-ground, few schools provide facilities for group self-activity; and in the absence of group self-activity, no esprit de corps is fostered. A recent writer[1] has characterised the average school of to-day as "an amazing net-work of customs, conventions, regulations, rules, rewards, and punishments." This system of formal sanctions, if carried too far, is a serious hindrance to the collective self-activity of the children, and the best and most natural means of its removal is through the substitution of group self-discipline for purely formal and external discipline.

As a type of successful group self-activity, we may refer to some educational experiments[2] made in the United States. These were carried out with the third grade pupils in the Chicago and Cook County Normal School. The pupils were allowed to choose whatever they wished to do, subject to the approval of the teacher, whose rôle was that of a friend and counsellor. They next divide themselves into groups of appropriate size according to the nature of the task. It began with three boys between eight and nine years of age. At first three half-hours in a week were granted, but the enthusiasm displayed by the children for the work was so great that at their own request it was increased to 45 minutes every teaching day. The groups first formed ~~were~~ included a printing group, three cooking groups, a photography group, a group for modelling in clay. Additional groups came into existence for wood-cutting, for the study of ant or bird life, as well as for room decoration. The children were in each case entirely responsible for the activities of their respective

1. cf. R.E. ROPER, The Individual and the Community.
2. C.A. Scott, Social Education, p. 103 et seq.

groups; and the results achieved were so successful that some boys had been in as many as fifteen groups within a year. The teacher wisely sought to train the children's powers of organisation and co-operation through their own collective self-activity. They showed such enthusiasm and perseverance in their work that the results amply justified the experiments.

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